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Abstract
Tweakable ciphers are a building block used to construct a variety of cryptographic
algorithms. Typically, one proves (via a reduction) that a tweakable-cipher-based
algorithm is about as secure as the underlying tweakable cipher. Hence improving
the security or performance of tweakable ciphers immediately provides correspond-
ing benefits to the wide array of cryptographic algorithms that employ them. We
introduce new tweakable ciphers, some of which have better security and others of
which have better performance than previous designs. Moreover, we demonstrate
that tweakable ciphers can be used directly (as opposed to as a building block) to
provide authenticated encryption with associated data in a way that (1) is robust
against common misuses and (2) can, in some cases, result in significantly shorter
ciphertexts than other approaches.
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Glossary of Abbreviations
The table below contains a list of acronyms, with references to the text. Acronyms
for various wideblock tweakable ciphers appear in Table 4.1 (pg. 43).
AE Pg. 3 Authenticated Encryption: A type of cryptographic algorithm that
protects both the privacy and integrity of data.
AEAD Pg. 3 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data: An AE algorithm
that also protects the integrity of unencrypted associated data.
AES Pg. 8 Advanced Encryption Standard: A widely used 128-bit blockcipher.
AEZ Pg. 3 (Not an acronym): Refers to both an AEAD algorithm and the wideblock
tweakable cipher from which it’s built.
CBC Pg. 40 Cipher block Chaining Mode: An encryption algorithm.
CTR Pg. 43 Counter Mode: An blockcipher-based encryption algorithm.
GCM Pg. 3 Galois Counter Mode: An AEAD algorithm.
IV Pg. 40 Initialization Vector: A input to an encryption algorithm that prevents
similar/identical plaintexts from generating related ciphertexts.
LRW Pg. 17 Liskov Rivest Wagner: A TBC with birthday-bound security. May also
refer to a disk-encryption algorithm that uses this TBC.
NH Pg. 56 Non-Linear Hash: A universal hash function.
OCB Pg. 2 Offset Tweak-based Code Book: An extremely fast AEAD algorithm.
PIV Pg. 47 Protected IV Mode: A modular framework for constructing wideblock
tweakable ciphers.
PRP Pg. 7 Pseudo-Random Permutation: A blockcipher is a PRP if it “looks
random” to a chosen-plaintext attacker.
SPRP Pg. 7 Strong Pseudo-Random Permutation: A blockcipher is a SPRP if it
“looks random” to a a chosen-ciphertext attacker.
STPRP Pg. 8 Strong Tweakable Pseudo-Random Permutation: A TBC is a
STPRP if it “looks random” to a a chosen-ciphertext attacker .
TBC Pg. 1 Tweakable Blockcipher: A generalization of a blockcipher, where each
key provides a large number of pseudorandom permutations.
TCT Pg. 42 Tweak-Counter-Tweak: TCT1 and TCT2 are wideblock tweakable ci-
phers offering birthday-bound and beyond-birthday bound security, respec-
tively.
TCTR Pg. 53 Tweaked Counter Mode: A wideblock tweakable cipher.
TPRP Pg. 8 Tweakable Pseudo-Random Permutation: A TBC is a TPRP if it
“looks random” to a chosen-plaintext attacker.
VCV Pg. 66 VHASH-Counter-VHASH: A wideblock tweakable cipher construction.
VHASH Pg. 67 (Not an acronym): A universal hash function.
XEX Pg. 17 XOR-Encrypted-XOR: A TBC with birthday-bound security.
XTS Pg. 15 XEX-based tweaked-codebook mode with ciphertext stealing: A
TBC with birthday-bound security.
vi
1. Introduction
A fundamental issue in cryptography is identifying assumptions that are both rea-
sonable and useful. For example, the assumption that factoring large numbers is
infeasible is generally regarded as satisfying both criteria.
In symmetric-key cryptography (i.e., cryptography where two or more parties
start with a shared secret), one often begins by assuming there exists some secure
blockcipher. Briefly, an n-bit blockcipher is an algorithm that takes two inputs: a
(random, secret) key and an n-bit string X, and outputs a second n-bit string, Y .
Anyone who knows the key can recover X from Y . The blockcipher is secure insofar
as absent knowledge of this key, the mapping from X-values to Y -values appears
random. Given a secure blockcipher, one can construct a variety of provably-secure
cryptographic algorithms, including encryption schemes and message-authentication
codes.
In a seminal paper [30], Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner argue that despite the past
popularity of blockciphers, blockciphers are the “wrong” primitive to start with. The
authors propose tweakable blockciphers (TBCs) as an alternative. A TBC functions
similarly to a regular blockcipher, except that it takes an additional input: a τ -bit
tweak. Instead of one random-looking mapping between n-bit strings, a TBC provides
2τ such maps — one for each tweak. To a third party that does not know the key,
each map should each appear random and independent of the others. This should
remain true even if the third party knows the corresponding tweak values.
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TBCs are thus a much more powerful primitive than traditional blockciphers,
so it’s natural to wonder if a secure TBC could be constructed without being pro-
hibitively slow. Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner, however, showed how to build an efficient
TBC from a blockcipher in such a way that the former inherits (most of) the latter’s
security, and doesn’t incur too much of a performance loss.
Subsequent work has helped validate the paper’s central thesis that TBCs are
not only useful, but significantly more useful than traditional blockciphers. Rog-
away’s Offset Code Book (OCB) [48, 46] is an excellent case study, because it was
initially conceived of as a blockcipher-based algorithm [48], rather than TBC-based
one. When recast in terms of a TBC [46], an act which simply required viewing some
of OCB’s internal machinery as a single black box, the length of its security proof
dropped from from 19 pages to two. Moreover, although one would expect starting
with a more-powerful primitive to induce overhead, the change in perspective actu-
ally revealed opportunities for stream-lining the algorithm by removing unnecessary
machinery. This provides a rather compelling case for further investigating TBCs as
a cryptographic tool.
All TBCs are functionally equivalent in the sense that one could replace, e.g.,
OCB’s TBC with essentially any other TBC, and the resulting OCB variant would
inherit the new TBC’s performance and security characteristics. Thus, any advance-
ment in the design of TBCs has the potential to impact a wide array of cryptographic
algorithms. This raises the question,
How can we improve the performance and/or security properties of TBCs?
We shed some light on the answer. We define and prove the security properties
of LRW2 (which consists of two rounds of the TBC construction by Liskov, Rivest,
and Wagner [30]), as well as the two Tweak-Counter-Tweak constructions, TCT1, and
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TCT2. (We introduced all three of these algorithms in prior publications [29, 53].)
Finally, we also refine TCT1 to produce VHASH-Counter-VHASH (VCV), a novel
TBC construction, and provide benchmarks for an implementation. These bench-
marks demonstrate that VCV likely1 outperforms competing “wideblock” TBCs in
software when AES is used as the underlying blockcipher. (AES is a widely supported
128-bit blockcipher.) The recent AEZ [23] algorithm is faster than VCV, but AEZ
offers a security proof only under a heuristic assumption.
Finally, we describe some of our other results from [53], which show how wideblock
TBCs, such as VCV, can be used to provide authenticated encryption with associ-
ated data (AEAD). (AEAD not only prevents a third party from learning information
about the plaintext, but it also prevents him from tampering with the ciphertext to
induces changes in a perhaps partially known plaintext.) The resulting ciphertexts
can, in some situations, be much shorter than could be achieved using traditional
methods. This results in significantly less bandwidth overhead when sending numer-
ous short messages, which in turn may lead to power savings for wireless devices.
Moreover, the algorithm is “nonce-misuse resistant” — it can continue to provide a
high degree of security even when programmers make certain types of mistakes when
using it. VCV out-performs the industry-standard Galois Counter Mode (GCM) [35]
by about 37% on older machines (Intel Core Duo), and is over twice as fast on newer
ones (i7-4770), despite having a strictly stronger set of security properties. The afore-
mentioned AEZ algorithm by Hoang, Krovetz, and Rogaway uses this TBC-to-AEAD
approach, built from a stripped-down version of AES.
1With the exception of AEZ, discussed later, were unable to obtain any optimized software im-
plementations of competing constructions, making comparisons difficult. However, these competing
constructions are required to perform certain computations sequentially (i.e., without the possibility
of software pipelining), permitting us to use a subset of these computations to establish a lower
bound on running times.
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1.1 Notes on source material
Parts of this work appear in previous publications [29, 53] that were produced with
coauthors.
The LRW2 algorithm was first described in CRYPTO ’12 [29], coauthored with
Shrimpton and Landecker (this paper referred to the algorithm as CLRW2). The
LRW2 design and its security proof were my contribution to the paper; Shrimpton
assigned me the task of finding a TBC construction with beyond birthday-bound
security, and edited my proof write-up. Both Shrimpton and Landecker provided
valuable sounding boards in the search for viable constructions. The CRYPTO paper
includes other TBC-related results to which I was not a contributer, but LRW2 is the
paper’s central result.
The PIV tweakable cipher framework and its instantiations, TCT1 and TCT2,
originally appeared in an ASIACRYPT ’13 paper [53], coauthored with Shrimpton.
I had decided to pursue a “wideblock” tweakable cipher construction while interning
at Voltage Security. I devised and wrote the proofs, while Shrimpton edited them
and provided essential guidance in how to package and present the results. The other
results in this paper concern using wideblock tweakable ciphers to provide AEAD.
Although I again devised and wrote the proofs, this was a relatively minor task com-
pared to deciding what to prove; as best I can recall, these were joint decisions that
emerged over the course of several conversations. I believe the initial idea to inves-
tigate AEAD was Shrimpton’s, while the idea for handling multiple error messages
(and using these as a model for certain side channels) was mine.
The VCV variant is a modest but, I hope, worthwhile improvement on TCT1; its
design and implementation are my own work.
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2. Preliminaries
This chapter introduces some standard cryptographic definitions and concepts. Read-
ers with a background in cryptography may safely skim or skip it.
Section 2.1 introduces the syntax of various cryptographic primitives, as well as
their associated security definitions. Next, Section 2.2 provides an example of a
“game-playing proof”. This type of proof is common in cryptography, and we shall
make extensive use of it. Finally, Section 2.3 describes the so-called “birthday para-
dox”, which plays a role in limiting how much data can be securely processed by
various cryptographic algorithms. We discuss it here because finding TBC construc-
tions that avoid the birthday paradox is one of our main contributions.
2.1 Cryptographic primitives
Blockciphers. An n-bit blockcipher is an invertible function that uses a secret key
to encrypt an n-bit string, producing an n-bit string as output. This mapping between
n-bit strings should appear essentially random to anyone who lacks knowledge of
the key. As previously discussed, blockciphers are a primitive used to construct
higher-level cryptographic algorithms (such as encryption algorithms that can encrypt
arbitrarily long bit strings).
More formally, we denote the set of n-bit strings as {0, 1}n, and the set of all
(finite) binary strings as {0, 1}∗. Let Perm (n) denote the set of all permutations on
{0, 1}n.
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Definition 1 (Blockciphers). Let n and k be positive integers. A function E :
{0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is a blockcipher if for each key K ∈ {0, 1}k, EK(·) :=
E(K, ·) ∈ Perm (n).
This describes the syntax of blockciphers, but we still need to define what it
means for a blockcipher to be secure. Informally, a blockcipher E is secure if, given a
random key K, EK “looks like” a random permutation to those who don’t know the
key. Because the number of keys, 2k, is typically much less than |Perm (n)| = 2n!,
EK cannot be a uniformly random permutation; however, we can hope that as long
as K remains secret, no one will be able to distinguish it from one in practice.
In order to make this statement formal, we need to introduce the notion of an
adversary.
Adversaries and oracles. An adversary A is an algorithm that is provided with
black-box access to zero or more functions, O1, . . . ,O`, called oracles. That is, A
can query an oracle Oi at a point x to learn Oi(x). However, A doesn’t learn any-
thing about the oracle’s behavior at other points that couldn’t be inferred from this
information. We typically limit the number of queries an adversary is permitted to
make in order to model the presumed computational resource limitations of an attack.
Both adversaries and oracles may be probabilistic, and oracles may also retain state
between invocations. We write AO1,...,O` ⇒ b to denote the event that A outputs b
when equipped with the indicated oracles. Note that in general, b will be a random
variable whose distribution is governed by the (probabilistic) behavior of both A and
its oracles.
An adversary is adaptive if each of its queries can depend on the results of previous
queries. Adversaries are always assumed to be adaptive unless we explicitly state
otherwise.
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(Strong) PRP security. Given a finite set S, letX
$←− S denote thatX is a random
variable uniformly distributed on S; in particular, K
$←− {0, 1}k indicates that K is
a random k-bit key and pi
$←− Perm (n) is a random permutation on the set of n-bit
strings. Let K and pi be so defined. To capture the notion that no one can efficiently
distinguish EK from pi, we define the pseudorandom permutation (PRP) advantage
of an adversary A against E as:
AdvprpE (A) := Pr
[
AEK ⇒ 1 ]− Pr [ Api⇒ 1 ] .
The intuition here is that A is some algorithm that submits a sequence of queries
x1, . . . , xq to an oracle O, receiving O(x1), . . . ,O(xq) as replies. Then A attempts to
guess if O = EK , in which case A outputs 1, or if O = pi, in which case A outputs
0. If A always guesses correctly, then AdvprpE (A) = 1; if A doesn’t do better than
random guessing, then AdvprpE (A) = 0.
Similarly, we define the strong pseudorandom permutation (SPRP) security of A
against E as:
AdvsprpE (A) := Pr
[
AEK ,E
−1
K ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
Api,pi
−1 ⇒ 1
]
.
Note that here, A is provided access to two oracles. So not only can A encrypt
messages of its choosing, it can also use its second oracle to decrypt ciphertexts of its
choosing.
Now, A could simply enumerate all 2k possible key values and output 1 if and
only if there is some key K ′ such that EK′(xi) = O(xi) for each i = 1, 2, . . . , q. For
typical n and k (e.g., n = k = 128), 2k  |Perm (n)|. In this case, Pr [ Api⇒ 1 ] ≈ 0
for even modest values of q, while Pr
[
AEK ⇒ 1 ] = 1, giving us AdvprpE (A) ≈ 1.
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But this “brute-force” strategy is not feasible for, e.g., 128-bit keys. Hence we will
usually restrict the class of adversaries under consideration to those running in time t
in some implicit model of computation; we informally deem E a PRP if AdvprpE (A) is
small (say, 2−60) for any A in this class. The consensus among cryptographers is that
there are blockciphers, such as AES, for which AdvprpAES(A) can safely be assumed to
be negligible for any A with realistic time constraints.
Tweakable blockciphers We are now in a position to define tweakable blockci-
phers and their close cousins, tweakable ciphers.
Definition 2 (Tweakable blockcipher.). Let k, τ , and n be positive integers. A
function E˜ : {0, 1}k ×{0, 1}τ ×{0, 1}n×{0, 1}n is a tweakable blockcipher (TBC) if
for each key K ∈ {0, 1}k and tweak T ∈ {0, 1}τ , E˜K(T, ·) := E˜(K,T, ·) ∈ Perm (n).
Abusing notation, E˜−1K (T, Y ) is the unique X such that E˜K(T,X) = Y .
In other words, once equipped with a key, a TBC provides a family of permu-
tations — one for each tweak — whereas a traditional blockcipher provides only one.
This means that a TBC with key space {0, 1}k and tweak space {0, 1}τ is syntacti-
cally a blockcipher with key space {0, 1}k+τ . The distinction arises in the security
definition.
(Strong) TPRP security. Just as we defined a blockcipher’s security in terms of
its indistinguishability from a random permutation pi, we define a tweakable blockci-
pher’s security in terms of its indistinguishability from Π, a family of (independent,
uniform) random permutations.
Fix positive integers τ , and n, and let
Π
$←− {f : {0, 1}τ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n : For all T ∈ {0, 1}τ , f(T, ·) ∈ Perm (n)} .
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Again abusing notation, let Π−1(T, Y ) be the unique X such that Π(T,X) = Y .
We define the (strong) tweakable pseudo-random permutation (TPRP) advantage
of an adversary A against E˜ as:
Advp˜rp
E˜
(A) := Pr
[
AE˜K ⇒ 1
]
− Pr [ AΠ⇒ 1 ] ,
Advs˜prp
E˜
(A) := Pr
[
AE˜K ,E˜
−1
K ⇒ 1
]
− Pr
[
AΠ,Π
−1 ⇒ 1
]
,
with probabilities over the randomness of A and the random variables K
$←− {0, 1}k
and Π. In other words, E˜ is secure if, when equipped with a random secret key, A
is unable to tell it apart from a family of independent, random permutations. Note
that because A has oracle access to either E˜K or Π, A’s queries are of the form
(T,X) ∈ {0, 1}τ ×{0, 1}n —A gets to choose which tweak is used on any given query.
Tweakable ciphers are a generalization of TBCs. While a TBC can only operate
on fixed-length inputs, a tweakable cipher does not necessarily have this restriction;
however, a tweakable cipher must preserve the lengths of its inputs.
Given S ⊆ N, define {0, 1}S = ⋃n∈S {0, 1}n. Then:
Definition 3 (Tweakable ciphers). Fix a set S ⊆ N and positive integers k and τ .
Then a function E˜ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}τ × {0, 1}S → {0, 1}S is a tweakable cipher if
for any key K ∈ {0, 1}k, tweak T ∈ {0, 1}τ and positive integer n ∈ S, E˜K(T, ·) ∈
Perm (n) when restricted to n-bit inputs.
Hence, if E˜ is a tweakable cipher, then
∣∣∣E˜K(T,X)∣∣∣ = |X| for all (K,T,X) ∈
dom(E˜).
Definition 4 ((Almost) ∆-universal hash functions). Fix positive integers k, `, and
n, and let  be a positive real number. Let + be a group operator on {0, 1}n. Let
H : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}` → {0, 1}n, and define HK(·) = H(K, ·). Then H is -almost
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∆-universal (-A∆U) with respect to + if, for any C ∈ {0, 1}n and any distinct
X,X ′ ∈ {0, 1}`, Pr [HK(X)−HK(X ′) = C ] ≤ . The probability is over the random
variable K
$←− {0, 1}k.
This is a strictly combinatorial property of H; there are no adversaries or com-
putational assumptions in this definition. If H is -A∆U with respect to ⊕ (bitwise
XOR; i.e., componentwise addition modulo two), then we refer to H as being -almost
XOR-universal (-AXU). Note that, in this case, addition and subtraction are the
same operation.
2.2 Game-playing proofs
We will often need to bound an expression of the form Pr
[
AR⇒ 1 ]−Pr [ AI ⇒ 1 ],
where A is some adversary and R and I are oracles (typically I will be some mathe-
matically ideal oracle, such as a random permutation, while R will be some real-world
object, such as a blockcipher equipped with a random key, whose security we are in-
vestigating).
To bound these expressions, we will make extensive use of so-called game-playing
proofs. The game-playing framework [5] was introduced by Bellare and Rogaway as
a means to facilitate cryptographic proofs. The framework is especially helpful in
reasoning about the sorts of conditional probabilities that arise when trying to prove
the (in)effectiveness of arbitrary adversaries. Because adversaries are permitted to
choose queries based on the results of earlier queries, this sort of reasoning can be
difficult and error-prone.
We first write an explicit program that, given A, describes the operation AR.
Because this program captures an interaction between A and an oracle, we refer to it
as a game. Then, starting from a first game, G0(A), we construct a sequence of games
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G0(A), G1(A), . . . , Gn(A) such that Gn(A) behaves identically to A
I (i.e., for any A,
the outputs of Gn(A) and A
I are identically distributed). Typically, G0(A) will just
consist of “glue” that relays queries from A to R and responses from R to A, while
Gn(A) will do the same with respect to I. The interesting work lies in designing the
remaining games.
We have immediately that
Pr
[
AR⇒ 1 ]− Pr [ AI ⇒ 1 ] = n−1∑
i=0
(Pr [Gi(A)⇒ 1 ]− Pr [Gi+1(A)⇒ 1 ]) .
Now, instead of finding an upperbound for the left-hand side directly, we can find up-
perbounds for each individual term on the right-hand side. We construct intermediate
games G1(A), G2(A), . . . , Gn−1(A) with the aim of simplifying this task.
Example: Distinguishing a random function from a random permutation.
As an example, let ρ
$←− {f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n} be a random function mapping {0, 1}n
to {0, 1}n, and let pi $←− Perm (n) be a random permutation. We will show that for any
adversary A making at most q queries, Pr [ Api⇒ 1 ] = Pr [ Aρ⇒ 1 ] ≤ q2/2n. What
follows is essentially an annotated and semi-formal version of Black and Rogaway’s
proof [5].
The outline of our proof is as follows: We can define the random permutation pi
by pulling values from the set {0, 1}n at random one at a time without replacement
to generate pi(0), pi(1), . . . , pi(2n − 1) (we identify elements of {0, 1}n with integers in
the appropriate range). So let G0(A) generate pi in this manner, and then use it to
respond to A’s queries. Alternatively, we could define pi though lazy sampling : when
the adversary submits a new query X, we pull a value Y from {0, 1}n at random
without replacement and set pi(X) = Y . Because this doesn’t change the distribution
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on pi, the adversary can’t tell the difference; hence, if we let G1(A) define pi in this
manner, then we have
Pr [ Api⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G0(A)⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G1(A)⇒ 1 ] .
Working from the other end, we can choose ρ by sampling ρ
$←− {f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n}
and use this to create game G4(A). Or, we could define ρ through lazy sampling —
this time choosing its output values by drawing from {0, 1}n with replacement to
create G3(A). We have:
Pr [ Aρ⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G4(A)⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G3(A)⇒ 1 ] .
Now, the only difference between games G1 and G3 is that the former samples values
without replacement, whereas the latter samples them with replacement. But for
even modest values of n (say, n = 128) and a large number of queries (say, q = 240),
A will only be able to query a small fraction of the domain {0, 1}n. So intuitively, it
seems like our decision about whether or not to sample with replacement would be
unlikely to affect A’s output. We now proceed to make this argument quantitative.
Suppose that instead of sampling values without replacement, we sample values
until we happen upon one that hasn’t been chosen before, and then return that one
(we assume q ≤ 2n). It may take us a longer time to return a result, but we haven’t
actually changed distribution of pi. And recall that an adversary accesses oracles in a
black-box fashion: it learns the value returned by a query, but nothing else. So let’s
use this method of defining pi for G2(A).
Suppose, however, that you were the adversary, and, as a thought experiment,
that you were in fact able to watch some Oracle literally pulling numbers out of a
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hat. How could easily could you tell the Oracle of G2(A) (which “loops” until it finds
a new value) apart from the Oracle of G3(A) (which always returns the first value
it draws)? The only way you could learn any information would be if the Oracle
happened to sample a previously chosen value, at which point the distinction would
be obvious. The Oracle’s behavior in the two games doesn’t diverge until this point
is reached — one could imagine that he even isn’t informed of what game he’s playing
unless this happens, so you can’t learn anything by watching him until then.
Games G2 , G3
Oracle f(X):
Y
$←− {0, 1}n
if Y has previously been returned then
bad ← true
Resample Y
$←− {0, 1}n until Y has not been previously returned
return Y
Listing 2.1: In Game G2, which includes the boxed statement, the oracle f imple-
ments a random permutation using lazy sampling. In Game G3, which excludes the
boxed statement, f instead implements a random function. An adversary’s ability to
distinguish one from the other is upperbounded by the probability that bad is ever
set to true.
We make this somewhat more formal by explicitly writing out the pseudocode for
these two games in Listing 2.1. The code for the two games differs only within an if
block, and this block begins by setting the boolean flag bad to true. (We adapt the
convention, here and throughout, that boolean values are initialized to false). As this
boolean value is monotonic — it can change from false to true but not the other way
around — the fundamental lemma of game-playing [5] tells us that
|Pr [G2(A)⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G3(A)⇒ 1 ]| ≤ Pr [G2(A) ; bad ] = Pr [G3(A) ; bad ] .
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That is, the probability of bad being set is the same in either game, and is an upper-
bound for A’s advantage in distinguishing the two games.
But the probability of setting bad on a particular query is at most q/2n. Therefore,
using a union bound, the probability that this flag will ever be set is Pr [G3(A) ; bad ] ≤
q2/2n. Collecting earlier results gives us Pr [ Api⇒ 1 ]−Pr [ Aρ⇒ 1 ] ≤ q2
2n
, as desired.
2.3 The birthday bound
The advantage of an adversary is typically a function of the number of queries that
it is permitted to make. For example, we will encounter a few TBCs E˜ that are
built from a blockcipher E and have the property that for any adversary A making q
queries and running in time t, there exists some PRP adversary B making q queries
and running in time t′ ≈ t such that
Advp˜rp
E˜
(A) ≤ AdvprpE (B) +
cq2
2n+1
,
for some modest constant c. That is, A cannot “break” E˜ unless there is some B (with
similar computational resources) that can “break” E. We have previously described
this informally by saying that E˜ inherits E’s security.
But this statement tacitly assumes that cq2  2n+1. Security bounds that have an
O(q2/2n) term are referred to as having “birthday bounds”. This term is a reference
to the so-called birthday-paradox, which states that, given a room with q people and a
year with 2n days, the probability that there will be two people who share a birthday
is upperbounded by q2/2n. (This upperbound is a good approximation for smaller
values of q, and assumes that dates of birth are independent).
Birthday bounds are ubiquitous in cryptography — we saw an example in Sec-
tion 2.2. Roughly speaking, they arise when an algorithm with n bits of state “looks
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random” unless an adversary can cause an internal state to be repeated.
In many cases, a birthday bound is not a problem. Consider the 128-bit AES
blockcipher: if q < 240, then q2/2128 < 2−48 ≈ 0.1 So an encryption algorithm with
birthday-bound security that uses AES can safely make 240 AES calls (assuming AES
is itself secure); because each AES block is 16 bytes, this corresponds to roughly 16
terabytes of data. However, there are circumstances where a birthday-bound becomes
problematic: when q can become large, or when n is small.
The former could occur when large amounts of data are processed or stored. For
example, the 16TB above becomes about 3.5TB if one uses the standard XTS [34]
disk-encryption algorithm where c = 4.5 [37]; it drops to under a terabyte if one
requires a 2−50 security bound instead of a 2−48 bound.
Similar problems emerge when n is small. Lightweight blockciphers have received
much attention recently (see, for example, the survey by Cazorla, Marquet, and Minier
[9]), where n ∈ {32, 48, 64} is typical. For n = 64, a security bound of even 2−40
requires q < 12, which translates to only 32KB. A TBC with a θ(q3/22n) security
bound, such as our LRW2 algorithm, raises this limit to about 5GB.
1We have asserted that 2−48 ≈ 0, begging the question of what numbers are “close enough” to
zero. This is ultimately a question of context and judgement. One can view the security bound as
the probability of a cryptographic attack succeeding; hence, a bound of 2−30 (roughly 1 in a billion)
may be sufficient for encrypting innocent text messages, while one may want a significantly lower
bound, such as 2−70, if one is protecting nuclear launch codes.
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3. The LRW2 Tweakable Blockcipher
The previous chapter outlined scenarios in which a TBC with beyond birthday-bound
security would prove valuable. This chapter describes our LRW2 construction, which
guarantees such a bound. We begin in Section 3.1 with an overview of prior TBC
constructions. Section 3.2 introduces LRW2 and provides a proof of its security; the
proof is rather involved, and constitutes the bulk of this chapter.
3.1 Prior TBC constructions
Figure 3.1: The LRW TBC.
Blockcipher-based constructions. In their
seminal paper [30], Liskov, Rivest, and Wag-
ner propose two n-bit tweakable blockcipher con-
structions, both based on some underlying n-bit
blockcipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n.
The first construction E˜ : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is defined as E˜(T,X) =
EK(T ⊕ EK(X)). This TBC has birthday-bound
security: given an adversary A making q queries
and running in time t, there exists some other adversary B making q queries and
running in time t′ ≈ t such that Advp˜rp
E˜
(A) ≤ Θ
(
q2
2n
)
+ AdvprpE (B). However, E˜ has
since received little attention because the two blockcipher invocations prevent it from
being competitive with the second construction in terms of performance. (Also note
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that the length of the tweak must be the length of the block.)
The second construction, LRW : {0, 1}k+k′ × {0, 1}τ × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n, requires
some -AXU hash function H : {0, 1}k′ × {0, 1}τ → {0, 1}n. Given H and E, we
define LRW[H,E]K ‖K′(T,X) = HK′(T )⊕ EK(HK′(T )⊕ EK(X)). See Figure 3.1.
This LRW construction has a similar security bound to the first, provided that
 = θ(2−n). Such a bound is obtainable using, for example, the polynomial hash [56]
PolyHash : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}nm → {0, 1}n given by
PolyHashK(X1X2 · · ·Xm) =
∑
XiK
i.
Here, multiplication and addition take place in the finite field F2n ; PolyHash is m/2n-
AXU by the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra.
The XE and XEX [46] TBCs likewise obtain birthday-bound security.
Minematsu’s TBC [38] can obtain better than birthday-bound security, but the
tweak length τ must be less than half of the block length n. Moreover, it requires
two blockcipher invocations to compute, and must re-key one of the underlying block-
ciphers each time the tweak changes. This incurs a significant performance penalty
because re-keying is an expensive operation intended to be amortized over multiple
blockcipher calls. On Intel’s Haswell chips, for example, the aeskeygenassist in-
struction must be invoked ten times to setup a 128-bit AES key; it has an inverse
throughput of eight cycles. (That is, although more than eight cycles may elapse
between when a single aeskeygenassist instruction is issued and when it completes,
the hardware pipeline can complete pending aeskeygenassist instructions at a rate
of one every eight cycles.) In contrast, the aesenc and aesenclast instructions,
which must also be invoked a combined ten times per AES call, have an inverse
throughput of only a single cycle [7].
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Dedicated constructions. Building a TBC from a blockcipher allows the latter
to inherit the security of the former, with some loss. However, it’s natural to wonder
if constructing a TBC “from scratch” would provide a more efficient construction
(and perhaps provide more security, as well). The difficulty here is that establishing
the security of blockciphers from first principles has eluded cryptographers; instead,
specific blockciphers are only deemed trustworthy after withstanding years of expert
scrutiny. This problem is at least as hard in the context of TBCs, because TBCs are
more powerful objects.
Nonetheless, there have been attempts at constructing TBCs without using some
underlying blockcipher. The Hasty Pudding [52] cipher predates the formalization
of tweakable ciphers, and was an entry in the AES competition. Ferguson et al.
invented Threefish [17] for use with the Skein hash function, a finalist in the SHA-3
competition. More recently, Jean, Nikolic´, and Peyrin [26] proposed constructions
that modify AES to support tweaks directly.
3.2 The LRW2 TBC
The centerpiece of this section is a TBC construction that provides beyond birthday-
bound security, admits a large tweakspace, and does not require re-keying of any
underlying object.
Given a blockcipher E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and a hash function family
H : KH×D → {0, 1}n, the LRW2 construction LRW2[H,E] : (KH)2× ({0, 1}k)2×D×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n is given by
LRW2[H,E]h1,h2,K1,K2(T,X) = LRW[H,E]h2,K2(T, LRW[H,E]h1,K1(T,X))
= EK2(EK1(X ⊕Hh1(T ))⊕Hh1(T )⊕Hh2(T ))⊕Hh2(T ).
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See Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: The LRW2TBC consists of two independently-keyed rounds of LRW
chained together. Both rounds use the same tweak.
The following theorem establishes LRW2’s security.
Theorem 1. Fix k, n > 0 and let E : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher.
Fix a non-empty set KH , and let D ⊆ {0, 1}∗. Let H : KH × D → {0, 1}n be an
-AXU function family. Let E˜ = LRW2[H,E] be the LRW2 construction, defined
above. Let A be an adversary asking a total of q queries to its oracles, running in
time t. Let ˆ = max{, 1/(2n − 2q)}. Then there exists an adversary B using the
same resources, such that
Advs˜prp
E˜
(A) ≤ 2AdvsprpE (B) +
4q3ˆ2
1− q3ˆ2 .
This bound requires some interpretation. Consider  ≈ 2−n (since there are ef-
ficient constructions meeting this, such as PolyHash), and assume q ≤ 2n−2. Then
ˆ ≤ 1/2n−1 ≈ 2−n for interesting values of n. Now the additive term in the bound is at
most p when q ≤ (p/(p+6))1/3ˆ−2/3, so for any small constant p we have q = O(22n/3).
Thus when AdvsprpE (B) is sufficiently small, LRW2 is secure as a tweakable-SPRP up
to about 22n/3 queries.1 Figure 3.3 gives a graphical comparison of our bound and
1We note that AdvsprpE (B) will be at least t/2
k ≈ q/2k by exhaustive key search so, q = 22n/3
requires k > 2n/3, which is met by AES (k = n = 128) and DES (k = 56, n = 64).
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Figure 3.3: The maximum advantage of an adversary making q queries against LRW2
(solid line) and constructions limited by the birthday bound, q2/2n (dashed line).
Here, n = 128,  = 2−n, and we have assumed the AdvsprpE (B) term is negligible.
the standard birthday bound.
Proof overview. The proof of Theorem 1 is quite long and involved, so we’ll start
by giving a high-level overview of it. Proofs demonstrating birthday-bound security
for TBC constructions typically “give up” if the adversary can cause a collision at a
blockcipher input. In constructions like LRW and XEX, the TBC output is no longer
random, even when the blockcipher has been replaced by a random permutation. We
overcome this problem by using two rounds of LRW2, and showing that it takes two
independent collisions on the same query to force non-random LRW2 outputs.
The chief difficulty is ensuring that the second LRW2 round can withstand a
collision so long as there was not also one on the first round. To this end, we argue that
given a collision-free first round, the resulting distribution of LRW2 output values —
including those which require a second-round collision to obtain — is extremely close
to that of an ideal TBC.
The bulk of the proof is a sequence of games bounding the success probability of
an adversary in the information-theoretic setting, where the blockciphers have been
replaced by random permutations. The first three games address first-round collisions,
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and show that the distribution of LRW2 outputs is consistent with that of an ideal
cipher unless there is simultaneous a second-round collision. Our next three games
address the case in which there is no first-round collision. By swapping the order
in which dependent random variables are assigned values, we can choose the output
early on in the game, and gain insight into the distribution by which it is governed.
This distribution is shown to be very close to the ideal one. The final two games are
used to derive an upper bound for the probability that the adversary can set a “bad
flag”, which would force the game to exhibit non-ideal behavior. In the end, we are
able to assume that the adversary is non-adaptive by giving it explicit control over
oracle return values. At that point, the -AXU property can be applied.
Proof. For notational simplicity, we write h1 for Hh1 , and h2 for Hh2 ; this should
cause no confusion. The majority of the proof will consider the construction LRW2
with EK1 and EK2 replaced with random permutations pi1 and pi2, which we write
as LRW2h1,h2,pii,pi2 . At the end we can make a standard move to lift to the fully
complexity theoretic setting.
Let A be an adversary making q queries. If the i th query is to the left (encryption)
oracle, we denote the query with (Ti, Xi) and the response with Yi; if the query is to
the right (decryption) oracle, the roles of Xi and Yi are reversed. We denote by Yi
the set of permissible (tweak-respecting) return values for an encryption oracle query,
and similarly, Xi is the set of permissible return values for a decryption oracle query.
That is,
Yi = {0, 1}n \ {Yj : j < i, Tj = Ti}
Xi = {0, 1}n \ {Xj : j < i, Tj = Ti} .
Given a set S ⊆ {0, 1}n and a string x ∈ {0, 1}n we define S ⊕ x = {s⊕ x : s ∈ S}.
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The permutations pi1 and pi2 are constructed lazily, while h1 and h2 are already defined.
Initially, boolean variables have the value false, integers are zero, and all other variable
types are undefined (equal to ⊥).
Game G4 of Listing 3.1 (pg. 33) simulates LRW2 exactly by lazily sampling values
for pi1 and pi2. Note that there is a certain symmetry between the encryption and
decryption oracles. This symmetry arises from the fact that LRW2 is the dual of
LRW2−1, in the sense that LRW2−1h1,h2,pi1,pi2(Y, T ) = LRW2h2,h1,pi−12 ,pi−11 (Y, T ).
The bulk of this proof concerns showing that a sequence of games are identical, or
are identical until a specified event occurs (a boolean variable is set to true). When
arguing that transitions between games are correct in this sense, we will exploit the
above symmetry by limiting our discussion to changes in the encryption oracle, and
hence to queries made to that oracle; the arguments used to justify the corresponding
changes in the decryption oracle are practically identical. Therefore fix some value
i ∈ [1..q], and assume the i th query is to the encryption oracle.
In Game G5 of Listing 3.2 (pg. 34), we change what happens when there is a
collision at the first block cipher: we sample Yi from the ideal distribution, but raise
a bad flag if we also encounter a collision at the input of second block cipher (bad1)
or if Yi is already in the defined range (bad2). Game G6, in the same listing, is
identical to Game G5, except Yi is not reassigned after a bad flag is set. Hence
Pr [G4(A)⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G5(A)⇒ 1 ] ≤ Pr [G6(A)⇒ 1 ] + Pr [G6(A) : bad1 ∨ bad2 ] .
Next we modify the section of code in Game G6 that is executed when no collision
occurs at pi1; i.e., when Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) 6= Xj ⊕ h1(Tj) for all j < i. Note that the random
variables Z and Yi are dependent. In Game G6, Z is chosen before Yi, but as long
as the joint distribution as preserved we may reverse this order. The resulting game
will be equivalent to Game G6. As always, the decryption oracle will be modified in
a similar manner.
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To describe the correct distribution for Yi, partition {0, 1}n into four sets, S1,
S2, S3 and S4. These sets are defined with respect to an oracle query (Ti, Xi) such
that no collision occurs at pi1; that is, such that Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) 6∈ Dom (pi1). (When
referring to Dom (·) outside of pseudocode, we refer to the set of points at which the
function is defined at the instant the adversary makes its i th oracle call [and similarly
for Rng (·)]; the game currently being used to define the oracle should be clear from
context). For y ∈ {0, 1}n, we say y is permissible when y ∈ Yi, and y is possible when
Pr [ Yi = y ] > 0, given our assumption that Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) 6∈ Dom (pi1) and the oracles’
execution histories for the first i− 1 queries.
Let S4 be the set of all non-permissible values. Note that if y is not permissible
(it has been returned on a query that used tweak Ti), then y is not possible (since
LRW2(Ti, ·) is a permutation and queries are distinct); hence S4 is a subset of the
impossible values. Let S3 be the set of impossible values that are permissible.
We now subdivide the set of possible values based on the conditional branch on
Line 6 in Game G6. Some values for Yi will only be returned if the choice of Z causes
a collision at pi2, while others can only be assigned in the absence of such a collision;
the former will be S2, the latter S1. More formally, one can see that y is not possible
if and only if y ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) and pi−12 (y ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi1)
Therefore let S1 = {y : y ⊕ h2(Ti) 6∈ Rng (pi2)}, and let S2 be the set of all other
possible values.
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In summary,
S1 = {y : y ⊕ h2(Ti) 6∈ Rng (pi2)}
S2 =
{
y : y ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) , pi−12 (y ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi1)
}
S3 = Yi \ (S1 ∪ S2)
=
{
y : y ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) , pi−12 (y ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi1)
} \ Yi
S4 = Yi = {Yj : j < i, Tj = Ti} .
When these sets are used in pseudocode, it is understood that they are defined at
the time the oracle call is made; although Rng (pi1) (for example) may change as code
executes, S2 does not change until the next query. When referred to by a decryption
oracle, the definitions for these sets are the same up to the previously mentioned
duality.
We will now compute the probability that Yi will be in each of these sets (again,
under the assumption that there is no collision at the first block cipher; i.e, that
Li = Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) 6∈ Dom (pi1)). Since S3 and S4 contain only impossible values,
Pr [ Yi ∈ S3 ∪ S4 | Li 6∈ Dom (pi1) ] = 0. Let N =
∣∣∣Rng (pi1)∣∣∣. Given y ∈ S2 and
Li 6∈ Dom (pi1), Yi = y if and only if Z = pi−12 (y ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti). This
value is in Rng (pi1) by definition of S2, and so this event happens with probability
1/N . Hence,
Pr [ Yi ∈ S2 | Li 6∈ Dom (pi1) ] = |S2| /N, and
Pr [ Yi ∈ S1 | Li 6∈ Dom (pi1) ] = (N − |S2|)/N.
Ideally, Yi would be distributed as pTBC(y) := Pr
[
Y
$←−Yi ; Y = y
]
= 1/(2n −
|S4|) (for y 6∈ S4) and zero otherwise. However, we have shown that if there is no
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collision at pi1 on the i
th query, then Yi is distributed as
plazy(y) := Pr [ Yi = y | Li 6∈ Dom (pi1) ] =

N−|S2|
N |S1| if y ∈ S1
1
N
if y ∈ S2
0 if y ∈ S3 ∪ S4
See Figure 3.4.
Figure 3.4: The distribution governing an oracle output Y in Game G6 given a
collision at the first blockcipher input (solid line) compared to the distribution an ideal
cipher would provide (dashed line). For most parameters of interest, the statistical
distance between these distributions will be negligible.
Although this distribution is not quite what we want, we will show that it is close
enough (even against birthday-type attacks). In particular, the statistical distance
δ(plazy, pTBC) :=
1
2
∑
y∈{0,1}n
|plazy(y)− pTBC(y)| = max
S⊆{0,1}n
∑
y∈S
(plazy(y)− pTBC(y))
will be on the order of q2/22n. Geometrically, this quantity corresponds to half the
shaded area in Figure 3.4. It can also be viewed as the area above pTBC but below
plazy (or the other way around).
We integrate statistical distance into the game-playing proof by exploiting the
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existence of a optimal coupling distribution Γ(plazy, pTBC) (see, e.g., Lemma 11.3 of
[40]). This distribution samples points from {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n and has the property
that when (Y, Y ′) $←− Γ(plazy, pTBC):
1. For all y ∈ {0, 1}n, Pr [ Y = y ] = plazy(y) and Pr [ Y ′ = y ] = pTBC(y).
2. Except with probability δ(plazy, pTBC), Y = Y
′.
So in Game G7 (pg. 35), we sample (Y, Y
′) $←− Γ(plazy, pTBC) and return Y . But
we also need to lazily sample a point Z for pi1 that is consistent with our choice. If
Y ∈ S2, then our decision is forced. On the other hand, if Y ∈ S1, then we can choose
any value for Z ∈ S ′ = Rng (pi1) ∩ {z : z ⊕ h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti) 6∈ Dom (pi2)}. Sampling
Z
$←− S ′ uniformly satisfies the need for the joint distribution on (Z, Yi) to be identical
in Games G6 and G7; e.g., in Game G7, for any fixed z ∈ S ′:
Pr [ Z = z ] = Pr [ Z = z | Yi ∈ S1 ] Pr [ Y ∈ S1 ] = 1|S ′|
(
N − |S2|
N
)
=
1
N
.
(By construction, |S ′| = N − |S2|).
Thus Pr [G6(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ] = Pr [G7(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ] and Pr [G6(A)⇒ 1 ] =
Pr [G7(A)⇒ 1 ] .
Then in GameG8, we return Y
′ instead of Y after sampling (Y, Y ′) $←− Γ(plazy, pTBC).
Since Y 6= Y ′ only with probability δ(plazy, pTBC), most of the time these two games
will behave identically. We set bad3 when they do not:
Pr [G7(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ]− Pr [G8(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ] ≤ Pr [G8(A) ; bad3 ] ,
Pr [G7(A)⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G8(A)⇒ 1 ] ≤ Pr [G8(A) ; bad3 ] .
Now that we return Y ′ instead of Y , the random variable Y serves no direct
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function. So in Game G9, we forgo assigning Y . Instead, we sample Yi
$←−Yi, and
then set bad3 with probability δ(plazy, pTBC). Values for pi1 and pi2 are chosen as before.
Thus, Games G8 and G9 are equivalent.
At this point, Yi is always sampled from Yi, and once assigned, its value is never
changed.
In Game G10, we give the adversary control over what value is assigned to Yi (or
Xi, in the case of decryption queries), but insist that the value be in Yi or Xi, as ap-
propriate. Because the adversary can compute Yi and Xi, it may simulate the oracles
of Game G9 if desired; hence, he can set the bad flags in Game G10 with probability
at least as high as any adversary can set the corresponding flags in Game G9. The
oracle’s outputs are now deterministic, and may be (trivially) computed by the adver-
sary in advance. Hence, we may assume without loss of generality that the adversary
is non-adaptive.
For the rest of this proof, all probabilities will be with respect to the experiment
G10(A) (unless the experiment is explicitly stated).
Let Q be the event that for there exist i, j, and k (with j, k 6= i) such that
Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) = Xj ⊕ h1(Tj) and Yi ⊕ h2(Ti) = Yk ⊕ h2(Tk). That is, Q indicates the
i th query is responsible for collisions at both pi1 and pi2. Our strategy is to show that
Q is extremely unlikely, since it requires two independent collisions involving a single
query. Barring such a query, we can show that the probability of a bad flag being set
is very small.
By definition of Q and the -AXU property of H,
Pr [Q ] ≤
q∑
i=1
∑
j,k 6=i
Pr [ h1(Tj)⊕ h1(Ti) = Xj ⊕Xi ] Pr [ h2(Tk)⊕ h2(Ti) = Yk ⊕ Yi ]
< q32.
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Define
βj = max
A˜
(
Pr
[
A˜G10 : badj | ¬Q
])
, and
βj(i) = max
A˜
(
Pr
[
A˜G10 : badj on query i | ¬Q
])
.
We consider the event in the latter definition to “trigger” even if it has also triggered
on an earlier query. (This definition assumes q is not so large that Pr [ ¬Q ] = 0, but
since our bound becomes vacuous before this threshold, this is not an issue.) When
bounding βj(i), we will assume the i
th query is made to the encryption oracle; as
before, the other case is symmetric.
Because bad2 can only be set if the conditions for Q are met, we immediately have
that β2 ≤ Pr [Q ] ≤ q32.
Note that bad1 is set on query i if and only if there exist j, k < i such that
Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) = Xj ⊕ h1(Tj) and pi1(Li)⊕ h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti) = pi1(Lk)⊕ h1(Tk)⊕ h2(Tk),
where we remind the reader that Li = Xi ⊕ h1(Ti). Our goal now is to bound
β1(i) = Pr [ ∃k < i : pi1(Li)⊕ pi1(Lk) = R(i, k) | ∃j < i : Li = Lj ∧ ¬Q ]
· Pr [ ∃j < i : Li = Lj | ¬Q ] ,
where, for brevity, we introduce R(i, k) = h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Tk)⊕ h2(Tk).
Because queries are unique and LRW2(Ti, ·) is a permutation, Li = Lj is only
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possible if Ti 6= Tj, bringing the -AXU property into scope. Hence
Pr [ ∃j < i : Li = Lj | ¬Q ] = Pr [ ∃j < i : Li = Lj ∧ ¬Q ]
Pr [ ¬Q ]
≤ Pr [ ∃j < i : Li = Lj ]
1− q32 ≤
q
1− q32 .
We now wish to bound
Pr [ ∃k < i : pi1(Li)⊕ pi1(Lk) = R(i, k) | ∃j < i : Li = Lj ∧ ¬Q ]
(this is other factor in our bound for β1(i)), so assume that there is some j < i such
that Li = Lj and that ¬Q.
Fix k ∈ [1..i− 1]. Consider the case that Li = Lk. Then pi1(Li) = R(i, k) is
equivalent to h1(Ti)⊕ h1(Tk) = h2(Ti)⊕ h2(Tk). Because queries must respect per-
tweak permutivity, Ti 6= Tk; hence by the -AXU property of H, in this case β1(i) ≤ .
On the other hand, if Li 6= Lk, we will trace the execution history of the game
backwards to when the values eventually assigned to pi1(Li) and pi1(Lk) become deter-
mined. Define root(x) = min {m : Lx = Lm}. Let i′ = root(i), and let k′ = root(k).
Since Li = Lj for some j < i, it follows that i
′ < i. Therefore, by our assumption
that Q does not occur, there is no ` 6= i′ such that Y` ⊕ h2(T`) = Yi′ ⊕ h2(Ti′). Hence
on query i′, pi1(Li) is sampled from a set of size at least 2n− 2q; this sampling occurs
indirectly through the random variable Z, itself sampled either on Line 813 or 836,
depending on which oracle receives query i′.
Now we compute when the value of pi1(Lk) = pi1(Lk′) is determined. If there
is no ` < k′ such that Y` ⊕ h2(T`) = Yk′ ⊕ h2(Tk′), then pi1(Lk′) is likewise sampled
indirectly from a set of size at least 2n−2q. However, if such an ` exists, then pi1(Lk) =
pi−12 (Yk′ ⊕ h2(Tk′))⊕ h2(Tk′)⊕ h1(Tk′), and we are forced to backtrack further to when
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pi−12 (Y` ⊕ h2(T`)) = pi−12 (Yk′ ⊕ h2(Tk′)) was defined. Fortunately, our assumption that
the conditions for Q are not met saves us from having to backtrack far. Let `′ =
min {m : Y` ⊕ h2(T`) = Ym ⊕ h2(Tm)}. Then ¬Q implies `′ = root(`′). Hence on
query `′, pi−12 (Y`′ ⊕ h2(T`′)) = pi−12 (Y` ⊕ h2(T`)) is sampled, through Z, from a set of
size at least 2n−2q. In the first of these two cases, let r = k′; in the second, let r = `′.
After query r completes, the value which will be assigned to pi1(Lk) is deterministic.
Suppose without loss of generality that i′ > r. Then pi1(Li) = pi1(Lk)⊕R(i, k)
only if on query i′, pi1(Li) = pi1(Li′) is assigned the unique value that makes the
former equation true; this happens with probability at most 1/(2n − 2q).
Let ˆ = max(, 1/(2n − 2q)). Then
Pr [ pi1(Li)⊕ pi1(Lk) = R(i, k) | ∃j < i : Li = Lj ∧ ¬Q ] ≤ ˆ.
We have
β1 ≤
q∑
i=1
β1(i) ≤
q∑
i=1
i−1∑
k=1
qˆ2
1− q3ˆ <
q3ˆ2
1− q3ˆ2 .
Our final task is to bound Pr [ bad3 ] = δ(plazy, pTBC). For j = 1, 2, 3, define
∆j =
∑
y∈Sj (plazy(y)− pTBC(y)). Since for any y, y′ ∈ Sj, plazy(y) = plazy(y′) (and
pTBC is constant in these sets), we have:
β3(i) = δ(plazy, pTBC) =
1
2
(|∆1|+ |∆2|+ |∆3|) .
The law of total probability tells us that ∆1 + ∆2 + ∆3 = 0, and, by construction of
S3, ∆3 ≤ 0. Further, since pi−12 (S4)⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti) ⊆ Rng (pi1), we have that for
y ∈ S2: plazy(y)− pTBC(y) = 1/N − 1/(2n − |S4|) ≥ 0. That is, ∆2 ≥ 0.
Therefore either ∆1 ≤ 0 (in which case δ(plazy, pTBC) = ∆2), or ∆1 > 0 (in which
case δ(plazy, pTBC) = −∆3). Hence, δ(plazy, pTBC) ≤ max(∆2,−∆3).
30
The quantity ∆2 can be bounded as follows:
∆2 = |S2|
(
1
N
− 1
2n − |S4|
)
≤ q
N(2n − |S4|) (2
n − |S4| −N)
≤ q
N(2n − q) (2
n −N) ≤ q
N(2n − q) (2
n − (2n − q))
=
q2
(2n − q)2 .
It remains to bound−∆3 = Pr
[
Y
$←−Yi ; Y ∈ S3
]
. Note that Y ∈ S3 only if there
exists j, k < i such that Xj ⊕ h1(Tj) = Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) and Yk ⊕ h2(Tk) = Y ⊕ h1(Ti).
We appeal to the -AXU property as before to argue that the probability of such j
and k existing is at most (q)2.
In both cases, β3(i) = δ(plazy, pTBC) ≤ q2ˆ2. (Recall that ˆ = max {, 1/(2n − 2q)}.)
Therefore β3 ≤ q3ˆ2. By the fundamental lemma of game playing,
Pr
[
ALRW2h1,h2,pi1,pi2 (·,·),LRW2
−1
h1,h2,pi1,pi2
(·,·)⇒ 1
]
= Pr [G4(A)⇒ 1 ]
≤ Pr [G6(A)⇒ 1 ] + Pr [G6(A) : bad1 ∨ bad2 ]
≤ Pr [G9(A)⇒ 1 ] + Pr [G9(A) : bad1 ∨ bad2 ] + 2 Pr [G9(A) : bad3 ]
≤ Pr [G9(A)⇒ 1 ] + Pr [G10(A) : bad1 ∨ bad2 ] + 2 Pr [G10(A) : bad3 ]
≤ Pr [G9(A)⇒ 1 ] + β1 + Pr [Q ] + 2β3
≤ Pr
[
AΠ(·,·),Π
−1(·,·)⇒ 1
]
+
4q3ˆ2
1− q3ˆ2 .
Thus by a standard reduction argument, there exists a B such that
Advs˜prpLRW2(A) ≤ 2AdvsprpE (B) +
4q3ˆ2
1− q3ˆ2 .
This completes the proof.
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A note on an error in a previous version. An earlier version of this proof
[29] attempted to, in effect, construct Γ(plazy, pTBC) explicitly — but failed to do so
correctly: we erroneously made a tacit assumption that ∆1 ≥ 0. We thank Gordon
Procter for bringing this mistake to our attention. Procter also helpfully provided
a suggested patch [44], which uses an if/else clause in the game-playing proof to
address the two cases ∆1 ≥ 0 and ∆1 < 0 separately. We believe Procter’s solution
succeeds in fixing the problem. Ultimately, however, we decided to use a coupling
distribution to abstract the details of transitioning from plazy to pTBC. This simplifies
some of the arguments, but admittedly sacrifices some of the explicitness present in
Procter’s proof.
Attacks on simpler variants. Having seen our construction, one may wonder if
simpler variants work. For example, consider LRW2 without the first Hh2(T ) XOR
operation, leaving
LRW2h1,h2,K1,K2(T,X) = EK2(EK1(Hh1(T )⊕X)⊕Hh1(T ))⊕Hh2(T ).
This variation permits a birthday-bound attack. Namely, an adversary could submit
queries in pairs, (Ti, X
′) and (Ti, X ′′), where X ′ and X ′′ are fixed, and a new random
tweak is used for each pair. By remembering the values LRW2(Ti, X
′)⊕ LRW2(Ti, X ′′),
which are independent of Hh2 , it could detect collisions in Hh1 , say by using a
hash table. That is, if Hh1(Ti) = Hh1(Tj), then LRW2(Ti, X
′)⊕ LRW2(Ti, X ′′) =
LRW2(Tj, X
′)⊕ LRW2(Tj, X ′′). The converse is false, but false positives could be
weeded out by testing a small number of X-values. Such an adversary would gain ad-
vantage close to one. Similar variations on LRW2 permit analogous attacks, though we
believe (but have not proven) that omitting the second Hh1(T ) XOR operation yields
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Game G4
Oracle LRW2(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Li ← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
if Li ∈ Dom (pi1) then
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕ h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
Yi ← pi2(Mi)⊕ h2(Ti)
else
Yi
$←− Rng (pi2)⊕ h2(Ti)
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
else
Z
$←− Rng (pi1); pi1(Li)← Z
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕ h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
Yi ← pi2(Mi)⊕ h2(Ti)
else
Yi
$←− Rng (pi2)⊕ h2(Ti)
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
return Yi
Oracle LRW2−1(T, Y ):
i← i+ 1; Yi ← Y ; Ti ← T
Ni ← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
if Ni ∈ Rng (pi2) then
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti)
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
Xi ← pi−11 (Mi)⊕ h1(Ti)
else
Xi
$←−Dom (pi1)⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
else
Z
$←−Dom (pi2); pi−12 (Ni)← Z
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti)
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
Xi ← pi−11 (Mi)⊕ h1(Ti)
else
Xi
$←−Dom (pi1)⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
return Xi
Listing 3.1: Game G4 simulates LRW2 by using lazy sampling to define the random
permutations.
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Games G5 , G6
Oracle LRW2(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Li ← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
if Li ∈ Dom (pi1) then
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕ h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
Yi
$←−Yi
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
bad1 ← true
Yi ← pi2(Mi)⊕ h2(Ti)
else
if Yi ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) then
bad2 ← true
Yi
$←− Rng (pi2)⊕ h2(Ti)
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
else
Z
$←− Rng (pi1); pi1(Li)← Z
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕ h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
Yi ← pi2(Mi)⊕ h2(Ti)
else
Yi
$←− Rng (pi2)⊕ h2(Ti)
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
return Yi
Oracle LRW2−1(T, Y ):
i← i+ 1; Yi ← Y ; Ti ← T
Ni ← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
if Ni ∈ Rng (pi2) then
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti)
Xi
$←−Xi
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
bad1 ← true
Xi ← pi−11 (Mi)⊕ h1(Ti)
else
if Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Dom (pi1) then
bad2 ← true
Xi
$←−Dom (pi1)⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
else
Z
$←−Dom (pi2); pi−12 (Ni)← Z
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕ h2(Ti)⊕ h1(Ti)
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
Xi ← pi−11 (Mi)⊕ h1(Ti)
else
Xi
$←−Dom (pi1)⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
return Xi
Listing 3.2: Game G5 behaves identically to Game G4, except we set a flag if either
(1) there are collisions at the inputs to both blockciphers or (2) there is a collision at
the input of the first and the output of the second. Game G6 is the same, except we
resample Yi after setting one of these flags.
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Games G7 , G8
Oracle LRW2(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Li ← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
H ← h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Li ∈ Dom (pi1) then
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕H
Yi
$←−Yi
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
bad1 ← true
else
if Yi ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) then
bad2 ← true
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
else
(Y, Y ′) $←− Γ(plazy, pTBC)
Yi ← Y ′;
if Y 6= Y ′ then
bad3 ← true
Yi ← Y
if Yi ∈ S2 then
Z ← pi−12 (Yi ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕H
else if Yi ∈ S1
Z
$←− Rng (pi1) \ (Dom (pi2) ⊕H)
pi2(Z ⊕H)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
pi1(Li)← Z
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕H
return Yi
Oracle LRW2−1(T, Y ):
i← i+ 1; Yi ← Y ; Ti ← T
Ni ← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
H ← h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Ni ∈ Rng (pi2) then
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕H
Xi
$←−Xi
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
bad1 ← true
else
if Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Dom (pi1) then
bad2 ← true
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
else
(X,X ′) $←− Γ(plazy, pTBC)
if X 6= X ′ then
bad3 ← true
Xi ← X ′; Xi ← X
if Xi ∈ S2 then
Z ← pi1(Xi ⊕ h1(Ti))⊕H
else if Xi ∈ S1
Z
$←−Dom (pi2) \ (Rng (pi1) ⊕H)
pi−11 (Z ⊕H)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−12 (Ni)← Z
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕H
return Xi
Listing 3.3: In Game G7, we use a coupling Γ to sample random variables from the
distribution of Game G6 (plazy) and the distribution of an ideal TBC (pTBC). We
return the former. In Game G8, we return the latter instead.
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Game G9
Oracle LRW2(T,X):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Li ← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
H ← h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Li ∈ Dom (pi1) then
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕H
Yi
$←−Yi
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
bad1 ← true
else
if Yi ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) then
bad2 ← true
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
else
Yi
$←−Yi
V
$←− {w ∈ R : 0 ≤ w ≤ 1}
if V < δ(plazy, pTBC) then bad3
$←− true
if Yi ∈ S2 then
Z ← pi−12 (Yi ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕H
else if Yi ∈ S1
Z
$←− Rng (pi1) \ (Dom (pi2) ⊕H)
pi2(Z ⊕H)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
pi1(Li)← Z
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕H
return Yi
Oracle LRW2−1(T, Y ):
i← i+ 1; Yi ← Y ; Ti ← T
Ni ← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
H ← h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Ni ∈ Rng (pi2) then
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕H
Xi
$←−Xi
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
bad1 ← true
else
if Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Dom (pi1) then
bad2 ← true
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
else
Xi
$←−Xi
V
$←− {w ∈ R : 0 ≤ w ≤ 1}
if V < δ(plazy, pTBC) then bad3
$←− true
if Xi ∈ S2 then
Z ← pi1(Xi ⊕ h1(Ti))⊕H
else if Xi ∈ S1
Z
$←−Dom (pi2) \ (Rng (pi1) ⊕H)
pi−11 (Z ⊕H)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−12 (Ni)← Z
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕H
return Xi
Listing 3.4: Since the previous game discarded one of the coupled random variables,
we no longer use the coupling distribution here. Instead, we sample directly from the
ideal distribution but still set bad3 with probability δ(plazy, pTBC).
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Game G10
Oracle LRW2(T,X, Y ):
i← i+ 1; Xi ← X; Ti ← T
Yi
$←− Y
Li ← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
H ← h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Li ∈ Dom (pi1) then
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕H
if Mi ∈ Dom (pi2) then
bad1 ← true
else
if Yi ⊕ h2(Ti) ∈ Rng (pi2) then
bad2 ← true
pi2(Mi)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
else
V
$←− {w ∈ R : 0 ≤ w ≤ 1}
if V < δ(plazy, pTBC) then bad3
$←− true
if Yi ∈ S2 then
Z ← pi−12 (Yi ⊕ h2(Ti))⊕H
else if Yi ∈ S1
Z
$←− Rng (pi1) \ (Dom (pi2) ⊕H)
pi2(Z ⊕H)← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
pi1(Li)← Z
Mi ← pi1(Li)⊕H
return Yi
Oracle LRW2−1(T, Y,X):
i← i+ 1; Yi ← Y ; Ti ← T
Xi
$←−X
Ni ← Yi ⊕ h2(Ti)
H ← h1(Ti)⊕ h2(Ti)
if Ni ∈ Rng (pi2) then
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕H
if Mi ∈ Rng (pi1) then
bad1 ← true
else
if Xi ⊕ h1(Ti) ∈ Dom (pi1) then
bad2 ← true
pi−11 (Mi)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
else
V
$←− {w ∈ R : 0 ≤ w ≤ 1}
if V < δ(plazy, pTBC) then bad3
$←− true
if Xi ∈ S2 then
Z ← pi1(Xi ⊕ h1(Ti))⊕H
else if Xi ∈ S1
Z
$←−Dom (pi2) \ (Rng (pi1) ⊕H)
pi−11 (Z ⊕H)← Xi ⊕ h1(Ti)
pi−12 (Ni)← Z
Mi ← pi−12 (Ni)⊕H
return Xi
Listing 3.5: Game G10 gives the adversary control over Yi values. Such an adversary
can set bad flags at least as easily as adversaries for Game G9 can. Additionally,
adversaries for Game G10 are, without loss of generality, non-adaptive.
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a construction secure against adversaries constrained to chosen-plaintext attacks.
One might also wish to try setting K2 = K1. While we know of no attacks here,
modifying our proof to accommodate this change would be non-trivial. In particular,
bounding β1 required us to trace back through a game’s execution history to determine
when pi1 became defined at particular points; this task would be messier and more
difficult to verify if pi2 = pi1. Still, this may merit future investigation.
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4. Wideblock Tweakable Ciphers
File System
Virtual Disk Partition
(Exposes plaintexts)
FDE
Physical Disk
(Stores ciphertexts)
Figure 4.1: FDE works by trans-
parently encrypting data before it
is written to the physical disk.
We have examined TBC constructions that in-
herit the block length of some underlying block-
cipher, typically 64 or 128 bits. In some con-
texts, however, we desire a TBC that operates on
a much larger domain — e.g., 512 or 4096 bytes.
In still other contexts, we desire tweakable ciphers
which, as the reader may recall from Definition 3,
support variable input lengths.
Section 4.1 motivates the study of these so-
called “wideblock” TBCs by discussing the con-
straints that preclude traditional encryption in
the context of full-disk encryption. Next, Sec-
tion 4.2 discusses previous wideblock TBC con-
structions and their limitations. We then introduce the Protected Initialization Vec-
tor framework in Section 4.3. We refer to it as a framework because it contains
two modular components which can be implemented using a variety of algorithms.
Section 4.4 specifies two sets of algorithms to use for these components, yielding
the Tweak-Counter-Tweak wideblock TBCs, TCT1 and TCT2. These two wideblock
TBCs, which we published earlier [53], address some of the limitations of previous
constructions. Finally, in Section 4.5 we refine TCT1 to obtain VCV, and provide
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benchmarks for our implementation.
4.1 Motivation: full-disk encryption
Most major operating systems include support for full-disk encryption. Windows
uses Microsoft’s BitLocker, Mac OS uses FileVault (or FileVault 2), while Linux
systems, including Android, can use dm-cyrpt. The above systems do not encrypt
individual files; rather, they work at a lower level of abstraction and encrypt disk
sectors. Working at this layer permits encryption to be file-system agnostic and
prevents file-system metadata such as file sizes and directory structure from leaking.
Bitlocker uses cipher block chaining (CBC) encryption, a standard blockcipher-
based algorithm. CBC, like most other standard encryption algorithms, takes an
initialization vector (IV) as one of its inputs. (The purpose of an IV is to prevent
the same message from being encrypted into the same ciphertext every time, and
to prevent similar messages from resulting in similar ciphertexts.) IVs are typically
generated at random and then stored or transmitted along with the ciphertext, but
Bitlocker instead hashes the sector ID to obtain a fixed IV for that sector. FileVault
uses AES-XTS [34], an encryption scheme based on a the XEX TBC that encrypts
each 16-byte block using a tweak obtained by concatenating the sector ID with the
current block’s offset into the sector. Linux’s dm-crypt supports both of these algo-
rithms, among others.
These modes seem sufficient in “stolen-laptop” scenarios (provided the laptop isn’t
stolen while the drive is decrypted), but fail to defend against more sophisticated
attacks. For example, an attacker who can see the encrypted disk image at different
times can determine which 16-byte blocks have changed when AES-XTS is used, or
determine the first modified 16-byte block of each sector when CBC is used. Even
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more worrisome is an attacker who tampers with the ciphertext to induce changes
in the corresponding plaintext. For example, an attacker who knows what sector a
CBC-encrypted system binary is saved to can, with some surmountable restrictions,
transform the binary into malware by flipping carefully chosen bits of the ciphertext!
The situation is less severe with AES-XTS, because an attacker can only corrupt 16-
byte blocks of his choosing (or revert them to a previous state). A modified ciphertext
block will result in a randomized plaintext block. There are times, however, where
even this capability would be problematic; in a white paper [16], Microsoft engineers
express concerns over such an attacker being able to toggle sensitive boolean registry
settings.
Traditional cryptography would solve the problem of leaking what 16-byte blocks
have changed by using a new IV each time a sector is re-encrypted. However, this
remedy is unavailable here because it would require a place to store the IVs, forcing
the file system to either use smaller logical disk sectors or to touch multiple physical
sectors each time a logical sector is accessed. Performance constrains rule out both
solutions. Similarly, a traditional solution to the tampering attacks would be to
include message authentication codes — the cryptographic equivalent of checksums —
in each disk sector. But again, this would require extra information to be stored on
the disk, raising the same issues as before.
This is where wideblock tweakable ciphers come in. Given a tweakable cipher
E˜ : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}τ ×{0, 1}s → {0, 1}s, we could encrypt an s-bit sector S by setting
the ciphertext to be C = E˜K(SectorID, S). Note that |S| = |C|, so this operation
can be done without changing the sector size or number of sectors. Furthermore, if
E˜ is a TPRP, then tampering with a ciphertext will essentially randomize the entire
s-bit plaintext: adversaries are denied the ability to conduct the precision tampering
that CBC affords them, and their ability to corrupt plaintexts is much more coarse-
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grained than with AES-XTS. Finally, although an adversary who sees the encrypted
disk image at different points in time can determine what sectors have changed, he
cannot determine where those changes occurred with any finer granularity.
We will discuss further applications of wideblock tweakable ciphers in Chapter 5.
For now, we turn our attention to constructions.
4.2 Previous constructions
Researchers have developed three general approaches for constructing wideblock tweak-
able ciphers from n-bit blockciphers; examples are shown in Figure 4.2. Each approach
has yielded a series of increasingly refined algorithms.
We contribute a new, top-down approach that leads us to the first beyond-
birthday-bound secure tweakable cipher suitable for encrypting long inputs (i.e.,
longer than the block length of an underlying blockcipher). Table 4.1 and Figure 4.3
compare existing algorithms with our new Tweak-Counter-Tweak TCT1 and TCT2
constructions in terms of computational cost and security, respectively. TCT1 is the
first tweakable cipher to require only a single blockcipher invocation and no extra
finite field multiplications for each additional n bits of input, while TCT2 is the first
to provide beyond-birthday-bound security (and still gets away with a fixed number
of finite field multiplications).
Note that the finite field operations counted in Table 4.1 take hundreds of cycles
in software [32, 2], whereas their cost relative to an AES blockcipher invocation is
much lower in hardware [33]. In modern Intel chips, which include some hardware
support for both AES and finite field multiplication, the relative cost of these opera-
tions depends on the specific architecture. On Ivy Bridge, AES has about twice the
throughput of finite field multiplications, whereas on the newer Haswell chips finite
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field multiplication is slightly faster than AES [18].
Cost
Cipher [BC] F2n× [Zw+] [Z2w] Ref.
HCTR ` 2`+ 2 – – [55]
CMC 2`+ 1 – – – [21]
EME 2`+ 1 – – – [22]
EME∗ 2`+ 3 – – – [19]
PEP `+ 5 4`− 6 – – [12]
HCH `+ 3 2`− 2 – – [11]
TET ` 2` – – [20]
HEH `+ 1 `+ 2 – – [50, 51]
TCT1 `+ 1 5 2`
(
n
w
)2
2`
(
n
w
)2
–
TCT2 2`+ 8 32 4`
(
n
w
)2
4`
(
n
w
)2
–
Table 4.1: Tweakable ciphers and their computational costs for `n-bit inputs. Costs mea-
sured in n-bit blockcipher calls [BC], finite field multiplications F2n×, and ring operations
[Zw+] and [Z2w], for some word size w. Typically, ` = 32 for FDE, and we anticipate
n = 128, w = 64.
The first approach for constructing tweakable ciphers, “encrypt-mix-encrypt”, is
used by CMC [21], EME [22], and EME∗ [19], which employ two rounds of encryption
separated by a light-weight “mixing layer”. CMC is the first in this line of work,
and can be used to encrypt strings whose lengths are integral multiples of n. EME
improves on CMC by allowing encryption and decryption to be parallelized, and
EME∗ extends the domain to include strings of arbitrary length.
Naor and Reingold [42] proposed the “hash-ECB-hash” approach, which sand-
wiches a layer of ECB-mode encryption between two invertible hashes. Informally,
the role of the hashing layers is to diffuse the input. The PEP [12] mode of opera-
tion employs this approach. TET [20] and HEH [50] provide various improvements,
notably in terms of performance. In each case, the two hashing layers require finite
field multiplications. A variant of HEH described by Sarkar [51], however, manages
to halve the number of multiplications that are required.
The final approach is “hash-CTR-hash”. CTR refers to Counter Mode, a stan-
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Plaintext
Invertible Block-Wise Universal Hash
Invertible Block-Wise Universal Hash
Ciphertext
T
T
Plaintext (R)Plaintext (L)
Hash
Ciphertext (R)Ciphertext (L)
Hash
T
T
Plaintext
S +T
Compute/Add offsets
Add offsets
Compute/Add offsets
Plaintext
S' +T
Figure 4.2: Three approaches for constructing wideblock tweakable ciphers. Top:
Hash-ECB-Hash. Middle: Hash-CTR-Hash. Bottom: Encrypt-Mask-Encrypt. In
these diagrams, EK is a blockcipher with key K, and T is the tweak. Note that in
all three cases, changing a single bit of the plaintext will affect the entire ciphertext
(and vice versa).
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dard encryption algorithm that in this context is sandwiched between two layers of
hashing. The hashing layers are not invertible, but provide the mechanism by which
the first output bits become dependent on every input bit. Examples include HCTR
[55], which initially offered rather poor security bounds, and HCH, which provides
birthday-bound security and requires only a single blockcipher key. Chakraborty and
Nandi [10] later gave a birthday-bound-security proof for HCTR.
We mention the LargeBlock constructions due to Minematsu and Iwata [39], since
they provide ciphers with beyond-birthday-bound security. These do not support
tweaking, but it seems plausible that they could without significant degradation of
performance or security. These constructions overcome the birthday bound by using
2n-bit blockciphers as primitives, which are in turn constructed from an n-bit TBC.
To our knowledge, LRW2 is the most efficient n-bit TBC with beyond-birthday-bound
security that supports the necessary tweakspace (Minematsu’s TBC [38] limits tweak
lengths to fewer than n/2 bits). Compared to TCT2, instantiating the LargeBlock
constructions with this primitive ultimately requires an extra six finite field multipli-
cations for each n bits of input. Thus, we suspect the LargeBlock designs would be
impractical even if adding tweak support proves feasible.
A construction due to Coron, et al. [14], which we refer to as CDMS (after the
authors), builds a 2n-bit TBC from an n-bit TBC, providing beyond-birthday-bound
security in n. Like PIV, CDMS uses three rounds of a Feistel-like structure. However,
our middle round uses a variable-input-length tweakable cipher, and we require a
weaker security property from the round. This allows PIV to efficiently process long
inputs. That said, CDMS provides an excellent way to implement a highly-secure 2n-
bit TBC, and we will use it for this purpose inside of TCT2 to build F˜ . (Nesting CDMS
constructions could create (2mn)-bit tweakable blockciphers for any m > 1, but again,
this would not be practical.) We note that Coron, et al. were primarily concerned
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with constructions indifferentiable from an ideal cipher, a goal quite different from
ours.
The Thorp shuﬄe [41] and its successor, swap-or-not [24], are highly-secure ci-
phers targeting very small domains (e.g., {0, 1}n for n ≤ 64). Swap-or-not could
almost certainly become a variable-input-length tweakable cipher, without changing
the security bounds, by using domain separation for each input length and tweak in
the underlying PRF. Essentially, one would make an input-length parameterized fam-
ily of (tweakable) swap-or-not ciphers, with independent round-keys for each length.
While still offering reasonable performance and unmatched security for very small in-
puts, the result would be wildly impractical for the large domains we are considering:
swap-or-not’s PRF needs to be invoked at least 6b times to securely encipher a b-bit
input (below that, the bound becomes vacuous against even q = 1 query), and disk
sectors are often 4096 bytes. Also, to match TCT2’s security, the PRF itself would
need to be secure beyond the birthday bound (with respect to n).
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Figure 4.3: Security bounds for TCT1, EME and TCT2, all using an underlying 128-
bit primitive and 4096-bit inputs, typical for FDE. The EME curve is representative
of other prior construction.
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4.3 The Protected IV framework
T
T
Figure 4.4: The PIV[F˜ , V˜ ] tweakable cipher. Input T is the tweak, and X = XLXR is a
plaintext string of length at least N bits.
We begin by introducing our high-level abstraction, PIV, shown in Figure 4.4. Let
T = {0, 1}τ for some τ ≥ 0, and let Y ⊆ {0, 1}∗ be such that if Y ∈ Y , then {0, 1}|Y | ⊆
Y . Define T ′ = T ×Y . Fix an integer N > 0. Let F˜ : K′×T ′×{0, 1}N → {0, 1}N be
a tweakable blockcipher and let V˜ : K×{0, 1}N×Y → Y be a tweakable cipher. From
these, we produce a new tweakable cipher PIV[F˜ , V˜ ] : (K′ ×K)×T ×X → X , where
X = {0, 1}N × Y . As shown in Figure 4.4, the PIV composition of F˜ , V˜ is a three-
round Feistel construction, working as follows. On input (T,X), let X = XL ‖ XR
where |XL| = N . First, create an N -bit string IV = F˜K′(T ‖XR, XL). Next, use this
IV to encipher XR, creating a string YR = V˜K(IV, XR). Now create an N -bit string
YL = F˜K′(T ‖ YR, IV), and return YL ‖ YR as the value of PIV[F˜ , V˜ ]K′,K(T,X). The
inverse PIV[F˜ , V˜ ]−1K′,K(T, Y ) is computed in the obvious manner.
At first glance, it seems that nothing interesting has been accomplished: we took
anN -bit TBC and a tweakable cipher, and produced a tweakable cipher with a slightly
larger domain. The underlying tweakable cipher, however, only needs to have a very
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weak type of security property, which we now proceed to define.
The strong-RND (SRND) advantage of an adversary A against a TBC E˜ is:
Advs˜rnd
E˜
(A) = Pr
[
K
$←−K : AE˜K(·,·),E˜−1K (·,·)⇒ 1
]
− Pr [ A$(·,·),$(·,·)⇒ 1 ]
where the $(·, ·) oracle always outputs a random string equal in length to its second
input: |$(T,X)| = |X| for all T and X. Adversaries are nonce-respecting if the
transcript of their oracle queries (T1, X1), . . . , (Tq, Xq) does not include Ti = Tj for
any i 6= j. Trivially, a TBC cannot be secure against general adversaries; A could, for
example, query (T,X) to its first oracle to obtain Y , then query (T, Y ) to its second
oracle and compare the result to X. Hence SRND security is only meaningful if the
TBC is used in some mode of operation that allows a reduction to a nonce-respecting
(or similar) adversary. Such is the case with PIV.
Theorem 2. Let sets T ,Y , T ′,X and integer N be as above. Let F˜ : K′ × T ′ ×
{0, 1}N → {0, 1}N be a tweakable blockcipher, and let V˜ : K × {0, 1}N × Y → Y be a
tweakable cipher. Let PIV[F˜ , V˜ ] be as just described. Let A be an adversary making
q < 2N/4 queries totaling µ bits and running in time t. Then there exist adversaries
B and C, making q and 2q queries, respectively, and both running in O(t) time such
that Advs˜prp
PIV[F˜ ,V˜ ]
(A) ≤ Advs˜rnd
V˜
(B) + Advs˜prp
F˜
(C) + 4q
2
2N
, where B is nonce-respecting
with queries totalling µ− qN bits in length.
The first thing to notice is that the variable-input-length portion of the PIV compo-
sition, V˜ , need be SRND-secure against nonce-respecting adversaries only. As we will
see in the next section, it is easy to build efficient schemes meeting this requirement.
Only the fixed-input-length portion, F˜ , needs to be secure against STPRP adversaries
that can use arbitrary querying strategies. (Recall from pg. 8 that STPRP adversaries
control the tweak, and have access to both encryption and decryption oracles.) Thus
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the PIV composition promotes nonce-respecting security over a large domain into full
STPRP security over a slightly larger domain.
The intuition for why this should work is made clear by the picture. Namely, if
F˜ is a good STPRP, then if any part of T or X is “fresh”, then the string IV should
be random. Hence it is unlikely that an IV value is repeated, and so nonce-respecting
security of the V˜ component is enough. Likewise when deciphering, if any part of
T, Y is “fresh”.
The term 4q2/2N accounts for collisions in IV and the difference between F˜ and a
random function. This is a birthday-bound term in N , the block length of F˜ . Since
most TBC designs employ (one or more) underlying blockciphers, we have deliberately
chosen the notation N , rather than n, to stress that the block length of F˜ can be
larger than that of some underlying blockcipher upon which it might be built. Indeed,
we’ll see in the next section that, given an n-bit blockcipher (and a hash function),
we can build F˜ with N = 2n. This gives us hope of building beyond birthday-bound
secure variable-input-length STPRPs in a modular fashion; we will do so, and with
relatively efficient constructions, too.
It will come as no surprise that, if one does away with the lower F˜ invocation
and returns IV ‖ YR, the resulting composition does not generically deliver a secure
STPRP. On the other hand, it is secure as a TPRP (just not a strong TPRP). This
can be seen through a straight-forward modification of the PIV security proof.
Proof. Fix a message space {0, 1}S (S ⊆ N), a tweakspace T , and a non-negative
integer n ≤ min(S). Let A be an adversary making at most q queries and running in
time t. Halevi and Rogaway [22] show that
Advs˜prp
PIV[F˜ ,V˜ ]
(A) ≤ Advs˜rnd
PIV[F˜ ,V˜ ]
(A) +
q(q − 1)
2min(S)+1
.
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This result is essentially a PRF–PRP switching lemma for TBCs, and reduces our
problem to that of bounding Advs˜rnd
PIV[F˜ ,V˜ ]
(A).
We begin in the information-theoretic setting, and consider E [V˜ ] = PIV[Π, V˜ ],
where Π
$←− BC(N) is an ideal cipher. The oracles in Game 11 simulate E [V˜ ] and
E [V˜ ]−1 using lazy sampling to define Π, so Pr
[
AE[V˜ ],E[V˜ ]
−1 ⇒ 1
]
= Pr [G11(A)⇒ 1 ].
In Game 12, we no longer resample “illegal” values when defining Π. The only
changes in the code occur after a boolean “bad” flag is set to true; by the Fundamental
Lemma of Game-Playing,
Advs˜rndE[V˜ ](A) ≤
(
Pr [G12(A)⇒ 1 ]− Pr
[
A$(·,·),$(·,·)⇒ 1 ])
+ Pr [G12(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ∨ bad3 ]
Note that in Game G12, V˜ is never queried using the same tweak twice. Hence we
may consider a third game (not shown), Game G13, in which V˜ is replaced by an
oracle $(·, ·) that always returns a random string equal in length to its second input.
By a reduction standard argument, there exists some nonce-respecting adversary B
making q queries and running in O(t) time such that
Pr [G12(A)⇒ 1 ]− Pr [G13(A)⇒ 1 ] ≤ Advs˜rndV˜ (B).
We now have
Advs˜rndE[V˜ ](A) ≤
(
Pr [G13(A)⇒ 1 ]− Pr
[
A$(·,·),$(·,·)⇒ 1 ])
+ Pr [G12(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ∨ bad3 ] + Advs˜rndV˜ (B).
However, note that now each the first N bits of each oracle output (corresponding
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to Z ′i) are always uniformly random in Game G12, and when we switch from V˜ to
$(·, ·) in the next game, the remaining bits also become uniformly random. Hence
Pr [G13(A)⇒ 1 ] = Pr
[
A$(·,·),$(·,·)⇒ 1 ].
Our final task is to bound the probability that A sets a bad flag in Game G12.
The probability that bad1 is set during query j is less than j/(2
N − 2j). Similarly,
the probabilities of bad2 and bad3 being set are at most 2j/(2
N − 2j) and 2j/2N ,
respectively. Therefore the probability that at least one flag is set during query j is
at most 3j/(2N − 2j) + 2j/2N .
Taking the union bound over j ∈ 1, 2, . . . , q gives us
Pr [G11(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ∨ bad3 ] ≤ q2
(
1.5
2N − 2q +
1
2N
)
.
Since q < 2N/4, 1.5/(2N − 2q) < 3/2N . Collecting our previous results and using a
standard reduction argument to return to the computational setting completes the
proof:
Advs˜prp
PIV[F˜ ,V˜ ]
(A) ≤ Advs˜rnd
V˜
(B) + Advs˜prp
F˜
(C) +
4q2
2N
,
where C makes 2q queries, B makes q queries of total length µ − qN bits without
repeating a tweak, and both run in O(t) time.
4.4 Concrete Instantiations of PIV
Instantiating a PIV composition requires two objects, a (fixed-input-length) tweakable
blockcipher F˜ with an N -bit block length, and a variable-input-length tweakable
cipher V˜ . In this section we explore various ways to instantiate these two objects,
under the guidance of Theorem 2 and practical concerns.
Theorem 2 suggests setting N to be as large as possible, so that the final term is
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Games G11 , G12
Oracle E`(T,X):
j ← j + 1
Tj ← T ‖X[N + 1..]
IVj
$←− {0, 1}N \ [(..Π] [Tj ])
Π[Tj ](X[1..N ])← IVj
IV ← IVj
if IVj ∈ {IVi : i < j} then
bad1 ← true
IVj
$←− {0, 1}N \ {IVi : i < j}
IVj ← IV // Rollback to “real” value
Zi ← V˜ [IVj ](X[N + 1..])
T ′j ← T ‖ Zi
Z ′i
$←− {0, 1}N
if IVj ∈ dom(Π[T ′j ]) then
bad2 ← true
Z ′i ← Π[T ′j ](IVj)
else if Z ′i ∈ [(..Π] [T ′j ])
bad3 ← true
Z ′i
$←− {0, 1}N \ [(..Π] [T ′j ])
Π[T ′j ](IVj)← Z ′i
return Z ′i ‖ Zi
Oracle E−1` (T, Y ):
j ← j + 1
Tj ← T ‖ Y [N + 1..]
IVj
$←− {0, 1}N \ dom(Π[Tj ])
Π[Tj ]
−1(Y [1..N ])← IVj
IV ← IVj
if IVj ∈ {IVi : i < j} then
bad1 ← true
IVj
$←− {0, 1}N \ {IVi : i < j}
IVj ← IV
Zi ← V˜ [IVj ]−1(Y [N + 1..])
T ′j ← T ‖ Zi
Z ′i
$←− {0, 1}N
if IVj ∈ [(..Π] [T ′j ]) then
bad2 ← true
Z ′i ← Π[T ′j ]−1(IVj)
else if Z ′i ∈ dom(Π[T ′j ])
bad3 ← true
Z ′i
$←− {0, 1}N \ dom(Π[T ′j ])
Π[T ′j ](Z
′
i)← IVj
return Z ′i ‖ Zi
Listing 4.1: Game G11, which includes the boxed statements, simulates PIV[Π, V˜ ]
by defining Π through lazy sampling. Game G12, which does not include the boxed
statements, never invokes V˜ with the same tweak twice, and the oracles in this game
always return values with a random n-bit prefix. All boolean variables are silently
initialized to false.
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vanishingly small for any realistic number of queries. But for this to be useful, one
must already know how to build a TBC F˜ with domain {0, 1}N for a large N , and
for which Advs˜prp
F˜
(C) approaches q2/2N . To our knowledge, there are no efficient
constructions that permit Advs˜prp
F˜
(C) to be smaller than O(q3/22n) when using an
n-bit blockcipher as a starting point. (A recent result by Lampe and Seurin [28]
shows how to beat this security bound, but at a substantial performance cost.) A
construction by Coron, et al., which will be discussed in more detail shortly, does
meet this bound1 while providing N = 2n.
So we restrict our attention to building TBC F˜ with small N . In particular, we
follow the common approach of building TBCs out of blockciphers. Letting n be the
blockcipher block length, we will consider N = n, and N = 2n. In the former case,
Theorem 2 only promises us security up to roughly q = 2n/2, which is the birthday
bound with respect to the blockcipher. With this security bound in mind, we can
use simple and efficient constructions of both F˜ and V˜ . On the other hand, when
N = 2n, Theorem 2 lets us hope for security to roughly q = 2n queries. To realize
this hope we will need a bit more from both F˜ and V˜ , but we will still find reasonably
efficient constructions delivering beyond birthday bound security.
In what follows, we will sometimes refer to objects constructed in other works.
These are summarized for convenience in Table 4.2 on pg. 54.
An efficient variable-input-length tweakable cipher. We will start by consid-
ering general methods for constructing V˜ . Recall that V˜ need only be secure against
adversaries that never repeat a tweak. In Listing 4.2, we see an analogue of con-
ventional Counter Mode (CTR) encryption, but over an n-bit TBC E˜ instead of a
blockcipher. We call the result tweaked-Counter Mode (TCTR). Within a call (T,X)
1However, nesting this construction to provide a variable-input-length tweakable cipher is pro-
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Name Description Ref
LRW Birthday-bound TBC. Requires blockcipher E and -AXU func-
tion H.
LRW[H,E](K,L)(T,X) = EK(X ⊕HL(T ))⊕HL(T )
[30]
PolyHashmn -AXU function with domain ({0, 1}n)m and  = m/2n.
PolyHashmnL (T1T2 · · ·Tm) =
m⊕
i=1
Ti ⊗ Li,
all operations in F2n
[56]
NH[νw, 2tw] -AU hash function. Fix word size w > 0. Requires ν even, inputs
are νw bits; here  = 1/2tw. Define:
HK1 ‖ ··· ‖Kν (X1 · · ·Xν) =
ν/2∑
i=1
(K2i−1+wX2i−1)·(K2i+wX2i) mod 22w.
NH[ν, t]K1 ‖ ··· ‖Kν+2(t−1)(M) = HK1···Kν (M)‖ · · · ‖HK2t−1···Kν+2t−2(M)
[6]
LRW2 TBC with beyond-birthday-bound security. Requires blockcipher E
and -AXU function H.
LRW2[H,E](K1,K2)(T,X) = LRW[H,E]K1(T, LRW[H,E]K2(T,X))
[29]
CDMS Feistel-like domain extender for TBC E˜.
CDMS[E˜]K(T, L ‖R) = E˜K(10 ‖ T ‖R′, L′) ‖R′
where R′ = E˜K(01 ‖ T ‖ L′, R) and L′ = E˜K(00 ‖ T ‖R,L).
[14]
Table 4.2: Our PIV implementations, TCT1 and TCT2, use the above constructions
from prior works.
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procedure TCTR[E˜]K(T,X):
X1, X2, . . . , Xν
n←X
for i = 1 to ν
Ti ← g(T, i); Zi ← 〈i〉
Yi ← E˜K(Ti, Zi)⊕Xi
Return Y1, Y2, . . . , Yν
procedure TCTR[E˜]−1K (T, Y ):
Y1, Y2 . . . , Yν
n← Y
for i = 1 to ν
Ti ← g(T, i); Zi ← 〈i〉
Xi ← Yi ⊕ E˜K(Ti, Zi)
Return X1, . . . , Xν
Listing 4.2: The TCTR tweakable cipher.
to TCTR, each n-bit block Xi of the input X is processed using a per-block tweak Ti,
this being determined by a function g : T ′ × N → T of the input tweak T and the
block index i.
Consider the behavior of TCTR when g(T, i) = T . The following result is easily
obtained using standard techniques.
Theorem 3. Let E˜ : {0, 1}k ×T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a tweakable blockcipher, and
let TCTR[E˜]K and TCTR[E˜]
−1
K be defined as above, with g(T, i) = T ∈ T . Let A be
a nonce-respecting adversary that runs in time t, and asks q queries, each of length
at most `n bits (so, µ ≤ q`n). Then for some adversary B making at most q` queries
and running in time O(t), Advs˜rnd
TCTR[E˜]
(A) ≤ Advp˜rp
E˜
(B) + 0.5q`2/2n.
We note that the bound displays birthday-type behavior when ` = o(
√
q), and is
tightest when ` is a small constant. An important application with small, constant `
is full-disk encryption. Here plaintexts X would typically be 4096 bytes long, so if
the underlying TBC has block length n = 128, we get ` = 256 blocks.2
Extending tweakspaces. In PIV, the TBC F˜ will need to handle long tweaks.
Fortunately, a result by Coron, et al. [14] shows that one can compress tweaks using
hibitively inefficient.
2Actually, slightly less than this when used in the PIV composition, since the first N bits are
enciphered by F˜ .
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an -AU hash function at the cost of adding a q2 term to the tweakable cipher’s TPRP
security bound. In particular, we will use (a slight specialization of) the NH hash,
defined by Black, et al. [6]; NH[r, s]L takes r-bit keys (|L| = r), maps r-bit strings
to s-bit strings, and is 2s/2-AU; see Table 4.2 (pg. 54) for the description. Given a
TBC E˜, E˜NH denotes the resulting TBC, whose tweakspace is now the domain of NH,
rather than its range.
4.4.1 Targeting efficiency at birthday-type security: TCT1
Let us begin with the case of N = n.
We will use LRW for the fixed-input length portion. We implement LRW’s -AXU
hash function with PolyHash, and then extend the tweak space using a fast -AU hash
function3 as described above.
The TCT1 Construction. Fix k, n > 0, and let N = n. Let E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and let PolyHashmn, and NH be as defined in Table 4.2.
Then define TCT1 = PIV[F˜ , V˜ ], where to obtain a τn-bit tweakspace and domain
{0, 1}{n,n+1,...,`n} we set:
1. n-bit TBC F˜ = LRW[PolyHash2n, E]NH[(`+τ)n,2n], i.e. LRW with its tweakspace
extended using NH. The keyspace for F˜ is {0, 1}k×{0, 1}2n×{0, 1}(`+τ)n, with
key K ′ partitioning into keys for E, PolyHash2n, and NH[(` + τ)n, 2n]. (Since
NH supports only fixed length inputs, we implicitly pad NH inputs with a 1 and
then as many 0s as are required to reach a total length of (` + τ)n bits.) The
tweakspace for F˜ is {0, 1}{0,1,2,...,(`+τ−1)n}.
3Indeed, one can show that composing an -AU hash function with an ′-AXU hash function
yields an ( + ′)-AXU hash function; however, we find it convenient to work on a higher level of
abstraction.
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Figure 4.5: The TCT2 construction (top). TCT2 takes τn-bit tweaks, and the input length
is between 2n and `n bits, inclusive. Here, F˜ is implemented using the 2n-bit CDMS
construction coupled with the NH hash function (bottom left). Both V˜ and the TBC E˜
used inside of CDMS are implemented using LRW2[PolyHashrn, E] (bottom right), with
r = 6 and r = 2, respectively. The function Pad maps s to s‖10(`+1)n−1−|s|. In the diagram
for CDMS, the strings 00T˜ , 01T˜ , and 10T˜ are padded with 0s to length 5n before being
used.
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2. Variable-input-length tweakable cipher V˜ = TCTR [LRW[PolyHashn, E]] with
the TCTR function g : {0, 1}n × N→ {0, 1}n as g(T, i) = T . The keyspace for
V˜ is {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n, with key K partitioning into keys for E and PolyHashn.
The tweakspace for V˜ is {0, 1}n, and its domain is {0, 1}{0,1,...,(`−1)n}.
Putting together Theorems 2,3, and results from previous works [6, 30], we have the
following security bound.
Theorem 4 (STPRP-security of TCT1). Define TCT1 as above, and let A be an ad-
versary making q < 2n/4 queries and running in time t. Then there exist adversaries
B and C, both running in time O(t) and making (`−1)q and 2q queries, respectively,
such that Advs˜prpTCT1[E](A) ≤ Adv
prp
E (B) + Adv
sprp
E (C) +
32q2
2n
+ 4q
2(`−1)2
2n
.
Proof. Using Theorem 2 and security bounds from the respective works cited in Ta-
ble 4.2,
Advs˜prpTCT1[E](A) ≤
4q2
2n
+ Advs˜rnd
V˜
(t′, q) + Advsprp
F˜
(t′, 2q)
≤ 4q
2
2n
+
[
q(`− 1)2
2n
+ Advp˜rpLRW[PolyHashn,E](t
′, (`− 1)q)
]
+
[
24q2
2n
+
4q2
2n
+ AdvsprpE (t
′, 2q)
]
≤ 4q
2
2n
+
[
q(`− 1)2
2n
+
3q2(`− 1)2
2n
+ AdvprpE ((`− 1)q, t′)
]
+
[
28q2
2n
+ AdvsprpE (t
′, 2q)
]
≤ 32q
2
2n
+ +
q(`− 1)2
2n
+
3q2(`− 1)2
2n
+ AdvprpE ((`− 1)q, t′)
+ AdvsprpE (t
′, 2q).
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This algorithm requires 2k+ (3 + τ + `)n bits of key material, including two keys
for E˜. As we show at the end of this section, we can get away with a single key for
E with no significant damage to our security bound, although this improvement is
motivated primarily by performance concerns.
Thus TCT1 retains the security of previous constructions (see Figure 4.3 for a vi-
sual comparison), and uses arithmetic in rings with powers-of-two moduli, rather than
in a finite field. This may potentially improve performance on some architectures.
4.4.2 Aiming for beyond birthday-bound security: TCT2
Now let us consider the PIV composition with N = 2n. For the fixed-input-length
component, we can use Coron et al.’s [14] CDMS construction to get a 2n-bit TBC
from an n-bit TBC, and implement the latter using LRW2. Table 4.2 describes
both constructions.4 We again extend the tweakspace using NH. (To stay above
the birthday bound, we set the range of NH to {0, 1}2n). Ultimately, setting F˜ =
CDMS[LRW2]NH is secure against up to around 22n/3 queries.
LRW2 also gives us a way to realize a beyond birthday-bound secure variable-
input-length component, namely V˜ = TCTR[LRW2[E,H], at least for ` = o(q1/4).
(We’ll see how to avoid this restriction, if desired, in a moment.)
We are now ready to give our second fully concrete PIV composition, TCT2, tar-
geted at applications that would benefit from beyond birthday-bound security. This
algorithm requires us to nest four layers of other constructions, so we provide an illus-
tration in Figure 4.5 (pg. 57). Again we emphasize that the (admittedly significant)
cost of F˜ can be amortized.
TCT2 supports τn-bit tweaks and has domain {0, 1}{2n,2n+1,...,`n}.
4We note that for CDMS[E˜], we enforce domain separation via E˜’s tweak, whereas the authors
of [14] use multiple keys for E˜. The proof of our construction follows easily from that of the original.
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The TCT2 Construction. Fix k, `, n, τ > 0, and let N = 2n. Let E : {0, 1}k ×
{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and let PolyHash`n, and NH be as defined in
Table 4.2. Then define TCT2 = PIV[F˜ , V˜ ], where:
1. F˜ = CDMS
[
LRW2[PolyHash6n, E]
]NH[(`+τ−1)n,4n]
. The keyspace for F˜ is {0, 1}2k×
{0, 1}12n×{0, 1}(`+τ−1)n, with key K ′ partitioning into two keys for E, two keys
for PolyHash6n, and a key for NH[`n, 4n]. The tweakspace for F˜ is {0, 1}τn.
2. V˜ = TCTR
[
LRW2[PolyHash2n, E]
]
, with the TCTR function g : {0, 1}n×N→
{0, 1}n as g(T, i) = T . The keyspace for V˜ is {0, 1}2k × {0, 1}4n with key K
partitioning into two keys for E and two keys for PolyHash2n. The tweakspace
for V˜ is {0, 1}2n, and its domain is {0, 1}{0,1,2,...,(`−2)n}.
TCT2 requires 4k+ (`+ τ + 15)n bits of key material. We have the following security
result.
Theorem 5 (STPRP-security of TCT2). Define TCT2 as above, and let A be an
adversary making q queries and running in time t, where 6q, `q < 22n/4. Then there
exist adversaries B and C, both running in O(t) time and making (` − 1)q and 6q
queries, respectively, such that Advs˜prpTCT2(A) ≤ 2AdvprpE (B) + 2AdvsprpE (C) + 12q
2
22n
+
q(`−1)2
2n
+ 6`
3q3
22n−2−`3q3 +
64q3
22n−2−63q3 .
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Proof. Using Theorem 2 and security bounds for the various components [6, 14, 29],
Advs˜prpTCT2(A) ≤
4q2
22n
+ Advs˜rnd
V˜
(t′, q) + Advsprp
F˜
(t′, 2q)
≤ 4q
2
22n
+
[
q(`− 1)2
2n
+ Advp˜rpLRW2[H2n,E](t
′, (`− 1)q, )
]
+
[
4q2
22n
+
4q2
22n
+ Advs˜prpLRW2[H6n,E](t
′, 6q, )
]
≤ 12q
2
22n
+
q(`− 1)2
2n
+
6`3q3
22n−2 − `3q3 +
64q3
22n−2 − 63q3
+ 2AdvprpE (t
′, (`− 1)q) + 2AdvsprpE (t′, 6q).
Some of the constants in this bound are rather significant. However, as Figure 4.3
shows, TCT2 nevertheless provides substantially better security bounds than TCT1
and previous constructions.
4.4.3 Additional practical considerations
Several variations and optimizations on TCT1 and TCT2 are possible. We highlight
a few of them here. None of these changes significantly impact the above security
bounds, unless otherwise noted.
Reducing the number of blockcipher keys. In the case of TCT1, we can use
a single key for both LRW instances provided we enforce domain separation through
the tweak. This allows us to use a single key for the underlying blockcipher, which,
in some situations, may allow for significant implementation benefits (for example,
by allowing a single AES pipeline). One method that accomplishes this is to replace
LRW[PolyHash2n, E]NH[(`+1)n,2n] with LRW[PolyHash3n, E]f(ε,·) and LRW[PolyHashn, E]
with LRW[PolyHash3n, E]f(·,ε). Here, f is a 2−n-AU function with keyspace {0, 1}3n×
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{0, 1}`n, taking inputs of the form (X, ε) (for some X ∈ {0, 1}n) or (ε, Y ) (for some
Y ∈ {0, 1}{0,1,...,`n}), and outputting a 3n-bit string. Let fL(X, ε) = 02n ‖ X and
fL(ε, Y ) = 1
n‖NH[(`+1)n, 2n]L(Y ). The function f described here is a mathematical
convenience to unify the signatures of the two LRW instances, thereby bringing tweak-
based domain separation into scope; in practice, we imagine the two instances would
be implemented independently, save for a shared blockcipher key. We note that TCT2
can be modified in a similar manner to require only two blockcipher keys.
Performance optimizations. If we need only a tweakable blockcipher (i.e., only
need to handle inputs of a predetermined length), we can use NH[`n, 2n] in place of
NH[(`+1)n, 2n] by adjusting our padding scheme appropriately. This change reduces
the length of the tweak, and hence the number of operations performed during the
NH computations. We emphasize that in the TCTR portion, the PolyHash functions
only need to be computed once, since each LRW invocation uses the same tweak. The
corresponding optimizations apply to TCT2, as well.
A na¨ıve implementation of TCT2 would make a total 72 finite field multiplications
during the first and third rounds (a result of evaluating PolyHash6n twelve times).
We can cache an intermediate value of the PolyHash6n hash used inside of CDMS
(four n-bit tweak blocks are constant per invocation), and this saves 32 finite field
multiplications. Precomputing the terms of the polynomial hash corresponding to
the domain-separation constants eliminates 12 more multiplications, leaving 28 in
total. Four more are required during the V˜ phase, giving the count of 32 reported in
Table 4.1.
Handling large message spaces. Both TCT1 and TCT2 are designed with FDE
applications in mind. In particular, they require ` to be fixed ahead of time, and
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require more than `n bits of key material.
These limitations are a consequence of using the NH hash function; however, a
simple extension to NH (described by the original authors [6]) accommodates ar-
bitrarily long strings. Fix a positive integer r and define NH∗L(M1M2 · · ·Mν) =
NHL(M1) ‖ NHL(M2) ‖ · · · ‖ NHL(Mν) ‖ 〈|M | mod rn〉, where |Mi| = rn for i < ν,
|Mν | ≤ rn, and NHL abbreviates NHL[rn, 2N ]. Thus defined, NH∗ is 2−N -almost
universal, has domain {0, 1}∗, and requires rn bits of key material. This modification
shifts some of the weight to the PolyHash hash; we now require eight extra finite field
multiplications for each additional rn bits of input. As long as r > 4, however, we
require fewer of these multiplications when compared to previous hash-ECB-hash or
hash-CTR-hash constructions.
With these modifications, the final two terms in TCT1’s security bound (Theo-
rem 4) would become 8q2/2n + 600q2`2/r22n + 4q2(` − 1)2/2n, where `n is now the
length of the adversary’s longest query, ` > 2.5r, and the remaining terms measure
the (S)PRP security of the underlying blockcipher. We also assume 2n ≥ rn, so that
|M | mod rn can be encoded within a single n-bit block. Although the constant of
600 is large, we note that setting r = 16, for example, reduces it to a more comfort-
able size — in this case to less than three. The bound for TCT2 changes in a similar
manner. (Note that, if 2n−2 ≥ rn, then we can use a single n-bit block for both the
tweak domain-separation constants and 〈|M | mod rn〉.)
Beyond birthday-bound security for long messages. When ` is not bounded
to some small or moderate value, TCT2 no longer provides beyond-birthday-bound
security. The problematic term in the security bound is q(`−1)2/2n. To address this,
we return to TCTR (Figure 4.2) and consider a different per-block tweak function.
In particular, g(T, i) = T ‖ 〈i〉. In the nonce-respecting case, the underlying TBC
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E˜ is then re-tweaked with a never-before-seen value on each message block. Again,
think about what happens when E˜ is replaced by an ideal cipher Π: in the nonce-
respecting case, every block of plaintext is masked by the output of a fresh random
permutation. In other words, every block returned will be uniformly random. Thus
we expect a tight bound, in this case. Formalizing this logic yields the following
theorem.
Theorem 6. Let E˜ : {0, 1}k ×T × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a tweakable blockcipher, and
let TCTR[E˜]K and TCTR[E˜]
−1
K be defined as above, with g : T ′×N→ T an arbitrary
injective mapping. Let A be a nonce-respecting adversary that runs in time t, and
asks q queries of total length at most µ = σn bits. Then there exists some adversary B
making at most σ queries and running in time O(t) such that Advs˜rnd
TCTR[E˜]
(A) ≤
Advp˜rp
E˜
(B).
Consequently, using this variation of TCTR in Theorems 4 and 5 would remove
the q(` − 1)2 term from the bounds, thereby lifting message length concerns. Note
that, if this change is made, then g(T, i) needs to be computed up to ` times per
invocation, rather than just once. This problem may be mitigated by using the
XEX [46] TBC in place of LRW, which makes incrementing the tweak extremely fast
without significantly changing our security bound.
When the above changes are made, TCT1 and TCT2 offer efficient tweakable ci-
phers on an unbounded domain, losing security guarantees only after O(2n/2) (resp.,
O(22n/3)) bits have been enciphered.
4.4.4 Instantiating V˜ with conventional encryption
To further highlight the flexibility surfaced by our compositional approach, we point
out that V˜ can be realized directly using conventional blockcipher-based encryption.
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Consider the implementation of V˜ , V˜ −1 shown in Listing 4.3. We recognize this
immediately as counter-mode encryption, but with the initial value T surfaced as an
input to make it a tweakable cipher. (Rogaway [47] formalized this as a “nonce-based
encryption scheme”.)
procedure CTRK(T,X):
X1, X2, . . . , Xb
n←X
for i = 1 to b do
Yi ← EK(T + i)⊕Xi
return Y1Y2 · · ·Yb
Listing 4.3: Counter mode (CTR) can be used to instantiate V˜ .
Unfortunately, we cannot use the main PIV security statement, Theorem 2, with
this F˜ , because it is not SRND-secure against nonce-respecting adversaries. Nonethe-
less, examination of the proof of Theorem 2 shows that it can be modified to work.
To that end, we introduce a new notion of security, SRND$:
Advs˜rnd$
E˜
(A) = Pr
[
K
$←−K : AE˜K(·),E˜−1K (·)⇒ 1
]
− Pr [ A$(·),$(·)⇒ 1 ] .
Given E˜ with tweakspace T and message space X , the oracle EK takes a query
X ∈ X and: (1) samples T $←− T , (2) returns EK(T,X). Oracle E−1K behaves likewise
on input Y ∈ X , sampling T $←− T and returning E−1K (T, Y ). With this, one can state
an alternative composition theorem.
Lemma 1. Let sets T ,Y , T ′,X , integer N , TBC F˜ and tweakable cipher V˜ be as
described in Theorem 2. Let A be an adversary making q < 2N/4 queries and running
in time t. Then there exist adversaries B and C, making q and 2q queries, respectively,
and both running in O(t) time such that Advs˜prp
PIV[F˜ ,V˜ ]
(A) ≤ 5q2
2N
+ Advs˜rnd$
V˜
(B) +
Advs˜prp
F˜
(C).
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Then a standard proof shows that the CTR TBC in Figure 4.3 is SRND$-secure, up
to a birthday bound, if E is secure as a PRP.
Lemma 2. Let E : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a blockcipher, and let CTR be as in
Figure 4.3. Let A be an adversary running in time t, and ask asking q queries, these
totalling at most µ = σn bits. Then Advs˜rnd$
V˜
(A) ≤ σ2/2n + AdvprpE (B), where B
asks at most σ queries, and runs in time O(t).
Thus, one could compose counter-mode encryption with F˜ based on LRW to build an
efficient, birthday-bound-secure STPRP.
Here we point out that there is much similarity between the SIV construction of
Rogaway and Shrimpton [49], and PIV using this counter-mode V˜ . Indeed, one can
view F˜K′(T ‖ X[N + 1..], X[1..N)) as a special kind of PRF (one with invertibility
properties), that takes input (T,X) and returns a “synthetic IV” for use in counter-
mode. The second application of F˜K′ then serves to hide this synthetic IV in way that
leaves it recoverable to those in possession of key K ′. The SIV construction achieves
both privacy and authenticity by using the IV as a plaintext authenticator, too. In
the next chapter, we’ll look at generic ways to build authenticated encryption with
the PIV composition.
4.5 VCV design and implementation
In this section, we introduce a novel wideblock tweakable cipher called ”VHASH-
CTR-VHASH” (VCV) that is a refinement of TCT1. VCV completely removes TCT1’s
finite field multiplications, simplifying its implementation and offering the potential
for performance improvements. We also discuss implementation issues and provide
benchmarks.
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4.5.1 Removing finite field multiplication
Recall that TCT1 employs LRW, and that LRW in turn requires an -AXU hash
function. These hash functions are typically instantiated using PolyHash, which eval-
uates a polynomial (with coefficients determined by the input) in F2n at the point
encoded by the key K ∈ 2n. However, finite field multiplications in, e.g., F2128 are
expensive (between roughly 63% and 245% the cost of an AES call in modern CPUs
[18], in terms of throughput). Although TCT1 succeeds in limiting the number of
multiplications to a small constant (that doesn’t grow with the input length), these
multiplications still incur a performance penalty and complicate implementations.
However, LRW[H,E] can work with a group operator + that need not be ⊕ ,
provided H is -A∆U with respect to +:
LRW[H,E](K,L)(T,X) = EK(X +HL(T )) +HL(T ).
Although this generalization is not explicit in the original paper [30], the authors list
UMAC’s hash function [6] among the possible instantiations, indicating they had this
generalization in mind. In any case, the security proof carries through as-is.
We opted to instantiate VCV by using LRW[VHASH,AES] for the fixed input-
length component of PIV, where VHASH is the hash function used by VMAC [15, 27].
VHASH (specifically, VHASH-128) is 2−120-ADU with respect to addition in Z264. This
corresponds to two standard unsigned 64-bit additions.
4.5.2 Implementation
We used a modified form of Ted Krovetz’s public-domain VMAC code5 for our
VHASH implementation. To take advantage of instruction-level parallelism, we in-
5http://fastcrypto.org/vmac/
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terleaved instructions for the final VHASH calculation with the AES-NI instructions
for the CTR-mode component of VCV.
In some architectures, this interleaving largely hides the latency of the VHASH
calculation. On an i7-4770 with 4096-byte blocks, for example, VHASH runs at 0.31
cpb, while CTR-AES runs at 0.65 cpb; thus, one would expect VCV to run at best at
0.31 + 0.31 + 0.65 = 1.27 cpb in the absence of pipelining (this conservatively ignores
the remaining cost of the two LRW computations). However, our implementation
runs at 1.08 cpb on this architecture. The difference is the equivalent of 61% the
stand-alone VHASH cost.
When AES-NI instructions are not available, our implementation falls back to
using the OpenSSL library. (OpenSSL itself supports AES-NI instructions, but using
OpenSSL functions instead of our specialized interleaved code reduces throughput by
about 1/3.)
4.5.3 Benchmarks
We compare the throughput of our VCV implementation to both GCM-AES-1286
and CTR-AES-128 in Table 4.3. The GCM-AES-128 comparisons are interesting for
two reasons: (1) VCV can be used for the same purpose as GCM, i.e., authenticated
encryption, despite offering a strictly stronger type of security (STPRP vs. AEAD)
and (2) although we were unable to obtain any optimized software implementations
for HEH or HCTR-style tweakable ciphers, GCM performance should provide an
approximate lower bound for these modes because it requires a blockcipher invocation
and a finite field multiplication for each n bits of input (cf. Table 4.1). Meanwhile,
EME will likely operate at less than half the throughput of CTR-AES-128, since
the latter requires two AES invocations per n bits of input, with no possibility of
6i.e., Galois Counter Mode (GCM) implemented with the version of AES that uses 128-bit keys.
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parallelism between the two passes though the plaintext.
Garc´ıa reports [31] that EME is between 2.21 and 2.34 times as slow as CTR-
AES-128 on a 4KB buffer, suggesting that this estimation works in EME’s favor (the
ratio changes with the architecture). Moreover, EME performed substantially better
than HCTR and HEH (2.77 cpb compared to 3.97 and 4.33 cpb, respectively; we
emphasize, though, that as these tests were performed on an i5-2400, they cannot
be compared directly to our own results.) Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain
the source code and so could not run these tests on the same machines as our VCV
benchmarks.
CPU VCV (4KB) GCM (8KB) CTR (4KB)
Broadwell i7-4770 (3.4 GHz) 1.08 1.77 0.64 (2x = 1.28)
Ivy Bridge i5-3570 (3.4 GHz) 1.41 2.98 0.71 (2x = 1.42)
Core2 DUO E8400 (3.0 GHz) 9.60 16.01 7.79 (2x = 15.58)
Table 4.3: Performance of VCV, GCM, and CTR in cycles per byte on various archi-
tectures. Garc´ıa reports [31] that EME operates at less than half the speed of CTR
on an i5-2400.
For VCV and CTR, we performed the benchmarks by timing how long it took
to repeatedly encrypt a 4KB buffer 100,000 times. For GCM, we used OpenSSL’s
native benchmark on an 8KB buffer (this works in GCM’s favor when performance is
measured in cycles per byte) with the native engine selected (openssl speed -evp
aes-128-gcm). Both our VCV implementation and OpenSSL 1.0.1f were compiled
using gcc 4.8.2 with the optimization level set to -O2. In neither case did performance
significantly improve with -O3. We used Intel’s optimized AES-NI implementation
for CTR [25] when available, which outperforms the OpenSSL implementation.
In all cases, VCV significantly outperforms GCM. On Broadwell and Core2 chips,
VCV also outperforms the estimated cycles-per-byte lower-bound for EME, but pro-
vides similar performance on Ivy Bridge. Hence, we suspect VCV would do at least
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as well as an optimized software implementation of any of the modes of Table 4.1.
We note that the recent AEZ tweakable cipher [23] claims performance comparable
to CTR. It obtains this by using a scaled-back variant of AES that uses four rounds
instead of the standard ten. Hence, unlike VCV, one cannot prove that AEZ is secure
under the assumption that AES is secure. There are, however, heuristic arguments
suggesting that AEZ is safe, regardless. A comparison to VCV over four-round AES
wouldn’t be particularly meaningful, since these same heuristic arguments would not
apply to VCV.
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5. AEAD from Tweakable Ciphers
We now turn our attention to a new use of PIV (and other tweakable ciphers), that
of building authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) [45] via a gener-
alization of Bellare and Rogaway’s “encode-then-encipher” [4]. Bellare and Rogaway
show that when messages are augmented with a nonce and redundancy, one can ob-
tain authenticated encryption [3] simply by passing these encoded messages directly
through an SPRP-secure blockcipher with a sufficiently large domain. (Similar tricks
do not work if the primitive is merely IND-NM or IND-CCA secure [1].) We revisit
encode-then-encipher in the tweakable setting. In particular, we precisely identify
the salient properties of the mapping from header-message pairs (H,M) to tweakable
cipher inputs (T,X), and explore where best to apportion state, randomness, and
redundancy in this encoding.
Our results answer natural questions regarding the relationship between tweakable
ciphers and nonce-based encryption. But there remains the question of why one would
adopt this method, given the existence of highly efficient AEAD schemes, such as OCB
[48, 46]. In addition to its simplicity, there are two important, practical advantages
of our approach:
(1) It admits the use of multiple decryption error messages, while remaining robust
against side-channel attacks that seek to exploit them (e.g., padding oracles).
(2) It can eliminate bandwidth overhead by leveraging nonces, randomness and
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redundancy already present in plaintext inputs.
The first point holds because, loosely, changing any ciphertext bit results in randomiz-
ing every resulting plaintext bit. Thus, descriptive error messages, e.g. bad padding
or bad seq number, cannot be leveraged to forge useful future ciphertexts. We also
remark that, under our approach, nonce repetitions only leak equality of plaintexts.
As an example of the second point, messages in protocols that include sequence
numbers, human-readable fields, or padding likely contain useful nonces and redun-
dancy. In these cases, the encoding step of encode-then-encipher is implicit, acting as
an assumed model for how information is encoded into bit strings before being passed
down the stack to encrypt.
Before moving on to formal definitions for our encode-then-encipher scheme, we
will provide a brief example of what we have in mind in order to motivate certain
departures from the standard AEAD formulation. Given a header H and a message
M , we need to encode (H,M) into a tweakable cipher input, (T,X). What if we
choose a nonceN of some fixed length, set T = N‖H, andX = N‖M? We are already
sending H down the wire, but our ciphertext cannot simply be C = E˜K(T,X) because
we also need N to decrypt. So our ciphertext should be (N,C). In this example,
T = N‖H was an encoded header, and X = N‖M was an encoded message. However,
we wish to consider encoding schemes separately from tweakable ciphers, so we will
discard the symbols T and X in favor of H and M , respectively. The mapping from
H to H = N ‖H is non-deterministic, but can be completely reproduced provided one
knows N . We therefore refer to N as our reconstruction information. (Note that the
message encoding function needs the reconstruction information, and therefore has
a different signature than the header encoding function; further, the reconstruction
information should not depend onM). The recipient computes E˜−1K (H,C) and verifies
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that N is a prefix.
Authenticated encryption with associated data. An authenticated encryption
scheme with associated data is a tuple Ψ = (K, E ,D) consisting of a key-generation
algorithm K, an encryption algorithm E , and a decryption algorithm D. For simplic-
ity, we assume the key-generation algorithm K samples a key from a non-empty set of
the same name. The encryption algorithm, which may be randomized or stateful, is a
mapping E : K×H×M→ R×{0, 1}∗. Thus, encryption takes a key K ∈ K, a header
H ∈ H ⊆ {0, 1}∗, and a message M ∈M ⊆ {0, 1}∗, and returns some reconstruction
information R ∈ R, along with a ciphertext C. We write (R,C) $←− EK(H,M) to
mean running EK on (H,M), this returning (R,C). The deterministic decryption
algorithm is a mapping D : K×H×R× {0, 1}∗ →M∪ Errors, where Errors is a set
such thatM∩Errors = ∅. (We do not insist that |Errors| = 1.) For proper operation,
we require that Pr [DK(H, EK(H,M)) = M ] = 1 for all K ∈ K, H ∈ H and M ∈M.
If E is stateful, this must hold for all states.
Let us discuss this formalization of AEAD. First, in practice, the header H will be
sent in the clear along with the ciphertext (e.g., when the header is needed for routing),
but our encode-then-encipher AEAD schemes may encode H into some related H
for internal use. If this encoding is non-deterministic, we use the reconstruction
information R to deliver whatever is needed by decryption to properly reconstruct
this H from H. For example, R may consist of a counter, some random bits, or some
redundancy. (It may also be the empty string.)
To avoid constructions that are trivially insecure by virtue of writing message or
key bits into R, we require the following. Given any sequence of inputs {(Hi,Mi)}i≤q
and any two sequences of possible outcomes {(Ri, Ci)}i≤q and {(R′i, C ′i)}i≤q, we must
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have that for any H ∈ H, M,M ′ ∈M, K,K ′ ∈ K, and r ∈ R,
Pr [R = r | EK(Hi,Mi) = (Ri, Ci) for i ≤ q ] =
Pr [R′ = r | EK′(H ′i,M ′i) = (R′i, C ′i) for i ≤ q ]
where (R,C)
$←− EK(H,M) and (R′, C ′) $←− EK(H,M ′), the states of EK and EK′ being
conditioned on the two transcripts, respectively. That is, R (hence, R′) can depend
only on H, q, and coins tossed by EK on the query that generates R.
Second, by allowing |Errors| > 1, we let our AEAD schemes return multiple,
distinct error messages. This can be useful in practice for, say, diagnostics within
a protocol session. Often, allowing decryption to return multiple error messages
has been problematic in practice; witness the various “padding oracle” attacks on
SSL/TLS [54, 8, 43]. For our encode-then-encipher AEAD schemes, such attacks will
not be a concern.
AEAD security notions. Our desired privacy notion is indistinguishability of ci-
phertexts from random bits. However, we do not require the recovery information to
be random (e.g., R might be a counter), so we modify the usual IND$-CPA notion
slightly. To be specific, we measure the privacy of an AEAD scheme Ψ via the follow-
ing advantage: AdvprivΨ (A) = Pr
[
K
$←−K ; AEK(·,·)⇒ 1
]
−Pr
[
K
$←−K ; A$K(·,·)⇒ 1
]
.
Here, $K(·, ·) is an oracle that on input (H,M), computes (R,C) $←− EK(H,C), sam-
ples Y
$←− {0, 1}|C|, and returns (R, Y ).
The authenticity goal for our AEAD scheme is integrity of ciphertexts, INT-
CTXT [3]. Namely, we define Advint-ctxtΨ (A) = Pr
[
K
$←−K ; AEK(·,·),DK(·,··) Forges
]
where the boolean event Forges is true if and only if A asks a query (H,R,C) to
its DK oracle such that (1) DK(H,R,C) 6∈ Errors, and (2) no prior query to EK(·, ·)
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returned (H,R,C). Without loss of generality, A halts as soon as Forges becomes
true.
5.1 Encoding schemes
Informally, an encoding algorithm is responsible for reformatting its input, injecting
randomness, state or redundancy, while decoding validates and distills out the original
input data.
Fix a message spaceM, a header spaceH, an encoded message spaceM⊆ {0, 1}∗,
and an encoded header space H ⊆ {0, 1}∗. All of these sets must be non-empty (but
could equal {ε}). Also fix a set Errors such that Errors ∩M = ∅.
As mentioned earlier, we need two types of encoding functions. A header encoding
function EncodeH : H → H maps headers to encoded headers, possibly in some
random or stateful fashion. We require there to be a non-empty set R and a bijection
〈·, ·〉 : R×H → H with the property that for all H, EncodeH(H) = 〈R,H〉 for some
R ∈ R. In other words, we should always be able to recover H from EncodeH(H),
and any particular output of EncodeH(H) can be reconstructed from H given the
corresponding R. We call EncodeH an (H,R,H)-encoder (leaving 〈·, ·〉 implicit).
A message encoding scheme EncodeMsg = (EncodeM,DecodeM) consists of a mes-
sage encoding function EncodeM : H ×M → M and a message decoding function
DecodeM : H×M→M∪ Errors. We allow EncodeM to be randomized or stateful.
We require DecodeM(H,M) = M ∈M if and only if Pr
[
EncodeM(H,M) = M
]
> 0
for some state of EncodeM; otherwise, DecodeM(H,M) ∈ Errors (note that we allow,
for example, DecodeM(H,M) = (⊥, H,M) ∈ Errors). The DecodeM algorithm must
be deterministic, and all algorithms should run in linear time. We call EncodeMsg a
(H,M,H,M,Errors)-encoding scheme.
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We only consider encoding functions having an associated maximal stretch, de-
fined to be the smallest s ∈ N such that, for all H ∈ H, H ∈ H, and M ∈ M,
|EncodeH(H)| ≤ |H|+ s and
∣∣EncodeM(H,M)∣∣ ≤ |M |+ s.
Encoding scheme properties. Our encode-then-encipher AEAD security theo-
rems will surface two key properties of the encoding mechanisms.
The first property speaks to the likelihood that an encoding scheme can be made
to repeat outputs.
Let A be an adversary that asks q queries (not necessarily distinct) to an oracle
f , receiving Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y q in response, and that halts by outputting these values.
(Think of f as a message — or header-encoding function.) Without loss of generality,
we can assume A is deterministic. Let δ : N → [0, 1] be a function. Generalizing the
definition from [4], we say f is (d, δ)-colliding if
Pr
[
Af ⇒ (Y 1, . . . , Y q) : ∃i1 < . . . < id such that Y i1 = · · · = Y id
] ≤ δ(q).
This notion is only defined for d ≥ 2. Given a (d, δ)-colliding oracle, we may assume,
without loss of generality that δ(0) = δ(1) = 0.
The second property captures the probability that a random string (of a given
length) is a valid encoding. One can think of this as a measure of the density of
encodings. Thus, let  ∈ R be a real number. The we say the (H,M,H,M,Errors)-
encoding scheme EncodeMsg = (EncodeM,DecodeM) is -sparse if for all positive
integers n and all H ∈ H, |{C ∈ {0, 1}n : Decode(H,C) 6∈ Errors}| /2n ≤ .
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procedure EK(H,M):
H ← 〈R,H〉 $←− EncodeH(H)
M
$←− EncodeM(H,M)
return R, E˜K(H,M)
procedure DK(H,R,C):
H ← 〈R,H〉
M ← E˜−1K (H,C)
return DecodeM(H,M)
Listing 5.1: The AEAD scheme Ψ[EncodeH,EncodeMsg, E˜]. Reconstruction infor-
mation R allows decryption to reconstruct H from the header. (This is in lieu of
sending H as part of the ciphertext, or forcing the calling application to replace H
with H.) All authenticity checks are implicitly carried out by DecodeM .
5.2 AEAD via encode-then-encipher
Now, let E˜ : K×H×M→M be a tweakable cipher. Let EncodeH be a (H,R,H)-
encoder, and let EncodeMsg = (EncodeM,DecodeM) be an (H,M,H,M,Errors)-
encoding scheme, for some non-empty sets H, M, and R. From these, we define
an encode-then-encipher AEAD scheme Ψ[EncodeH,EncodeMsg, E˜] in Figure 5.1. As
a simple example, let EncodeH prepend an 64-bit counter R to the header H, and
EncodeM(H,M) return M ‖ 080. Then EncodeH is (2, 0)-colliding, and EncodeM is
2−80-sparse (but (2, 1)-colliding). We point out that all authenticity checks implicitly
take place inside of the DecodeM function.
Security theorems and discussion. Here we give the privacy and authenticity
security statements for our encode-then-encipher AEAD scheme. We’ll give the state-
ments first, and then discuss what they imply. Proofs follow the discussion.
Theorem 7 (Privacy). Let Ψ = Ψ[EncodeH,EncodeMsg, E˜] be defined as in Fig-
ure 5.1. Let s be the maximal stretch of EncodeMsg, s′ be the maximal stretch of
EncodeH, and let m be the length of the shortest M ∈M satisfying DecodeM(H,M) 6=
Errors for some H ∈ H. Let A be an adversary making q queries totaling µ bits, and
running in time t. Then if EncodeH is (d, δH)-colliding and EncodeM is (2, δM)-
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colliding for some δM that is increasing and convex on {0, 1, . . . , q}, there is an ad-
versary B such that
AdvprivΨ (A) ≤ Advp˜rpE˜ (B) +
(
δM(d− 1) + (d− 1)(d− 2)
2m+1
)⌈
q
d− 1
⌉
+
(
δM(q) +
q(q − 1)
2m+1
)
δH(q)
where B makes q queries of total length at most µ+q(s+s′) bits and runs in time O(t).
Theorem 8 (Authenticity). Let Ψ[E˜] = Ψ[EncodeH,EncodeMsg, E˜] be defined as in
Figure 5.1. Let s be the stretch of EncodeMsg, s′ be the maximal stretch of EncodeH,
and define m as the length of the shortest M ∈M satisfying DecodeM(H,M) 6= Errors
for some H ∈ H. Let A be an adversary making qE (resp., qD) queries totaling µE
(resp., µD) bits to its encryption (resp., decryption) oracle, and running in time t.
Then if EncodeM is -sparse and qE + qD < 2m−1, there is an adversary B such that
Advint-ctxt
Ψ[E˜]
(A) ≤ Advs˜prp
E˜
(B) + 2qD.
where B makes qE forward-queries of total length (µE + qEs) bits, qD inverse-queries
of total length (µD + qDs′) bits, and runs in O(t) time.
To begin our discussion of these results, consider the case that EncodeH is (2, 0)-
colliding. Then the privacy bound (Theorem 7) simplifies to AdvprivΨ (A) ≤ Advp˜rpE˜ (B).
This is intuitive, because, if the tweak H never repeats, then the outputs E˜K(H,M)
are uniformly random strings for any valid encoding of (H,M) intoM ; EncodeH(H,M) =
M suffices. Thus, good encodings of the header H can substantially reduce the burden
placed upon encoding of (H,M) into M .
This case generalizes nicely. Say that we can assume that the probability of
EncodeH producing any H more than d times, for some small constant d  q, is
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negligible. Then the final term in the bound can effectively be ignored. The second
term is roughly qδM(d) + q/2
m+1. Now, notice that δM is evaluated at d, not q, and
so qδM(d) can be made negligible by encoding a reasonable amount of randomness
into M (e.g. log(q) bits). For some natural choices of EncodeMsg then, q/2m+1 will
be the dominating term, where m is the shortest length of M . But to achieve good
authenticity bounds, which we will turn to momentarily, m is unlikely to let q/2m+1
ruin the bound.
We point out that in the un-tweakable setting considered in [4], privacy must be
achieved by encoding randomness or state into M . The presence of the tweak allows
us to shift these “extra” bits into the encoding of the header, which potentially reduces
the number of bits that must be cryptographically processed.
In the extreme case thatH is fixed across all queries (perhaps by design, or perhaps
a result of a faulty implementation), the construction reverts to the un-tweakable
setting. In this case, EncodeH is (2, 1)-colliding, we recover, essentially, the bound
of Bellare and Rogaway [4]. (But note that we consider indistinguishability from
random bits, which is stronger than the privacy notion considered there.)
Turning now to the authenticity bound (Theorem 8), note that if EncodeM inserts
b redundant bits (so  ≈ 2−b) and qE + qD  2m, the second term of our authenticity
bound is approximately qD/2b. Thus, if the tweakable cipher E˜ has STPRP-security
up to (say) 280 queries (e.g., an appropriately instantiated PIV with N = 256), then
encoding the header with a nonce, and the message with 80 bits of redundancy, yields
an AEAD scheme with roughly 80-bit privacy and authenticity guarantees, and one
that can tolerate nonce-misuse.
We note that the proof of Theorem 8 can be easily modified to show that the
stated bound holds even if the adversary controls the coins and state of EncodeM
and EncodeH. Additionally, we assume only that decryption oracle queries are not
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redundant — adversaries are not assumed to respect any nonces encoded into the
headers or messages.
Relationship to deterministic authenticated encryption. Motivated by the
key-wrapping problem, Rogaway and Shrimpton [49] introduce deterministic au-
thenticated encryption (DAE). The encryption and decryption algorithms of a DAE
scheme take a header string as an auxiliary input, as in the AEAD case. However,
both algorithms are required to be deterministic. The corresponding security notion
considers only adversaries that never repeat queries (or that make redundant queries
to a decryption oracle).
Our encode-then-encipher AEAD scheme may be viewed as a DAE scheme, pro-
vided the EncodeM and EncodeH algorithms are deterministic. One can easily show
that the DAE security of a scheme is upper bounded by the sum of its privacy and
authenticity bounds, as given in Theorems 7 and 8. We note that, under the as-
sumption that adversaries do not repeat queries, the privacy bound from Theorem 7
reduces to Advp˜rp
E˜
(B) + q2/2m+1 for some adversary B. Obtaining this result re-
quires trivial proof modifications, and generalizes a result from [49], which considers
EncodeM(H,M) = M ‖ 0s.
Subsequent work. In a recent paper [23], Hoang, Krovetz, and Rogaway intro-
duced a security notion they term robust authenticated encryption. In order to meet
this security definition, it must be not only be difficult for an adversary to forge a
ciphertext, but being able to find one or more forgeries should not increase the ad-
versary’s ability to make further forgeries. This property is valuable if bandwidth
restrictions permit only small authentication tags. The authors observe that tweak-
able ciphers provide this stronger form of security.
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5.3 Proof of Theorem 7
Proof. Let Π
$←− BC(H,M) be a random cipher. Let Ψ[Π] be the AEAD scheme
obtained by replacing E˜K and E˜
−1
K with Π and Π
−1, respectively, everywhere in
the algorithms of Ψ[EncodeH,EncodeMsg, E˜]. Let EΠ be the corresponding encryp-
tion algorithm. We begin by observing that Pr
[
AEK(·,·)⇒ 1 ] − Pr [ AEΠ(·,·)⇒ 1 ] ≤
Advp˜rp
E˜
(B), for the standard adversary B that simulates EK or EΠ, depending on
its own oracle. This leaves us with AdvprivΨ (A) ≤ Advp˜rpE˜ (B) + Pr
[
AEΠ(·,·)⇒ 1 ] −
Pr
[
K
$←−K ; A$K(·,·)⇒ 1
]
.
Now we proceed by a sequence of games. Let s be the stretch of EncodeM.
Game G1 implements EΠ, using lazy-sampling to define Π. In particular, on the
i-th query (Hi,Mi), Game G1 computes the encodings H i,M i, and then samples
a potential value Si to assign to Π(H i,M i). This value will be valid so long as
Π(H i,M i) has not already been set, and as long as Si has not been used with H i
before; otherwise, Game G1 sets bad1 or bad2, and then reassigns Si an appropriate
value.
Since Game G2 is identical to Game G1 until bad1 or bad2 is set, we have
Pr
[
AEΠ(·,·)⇒ 1 ] = Pr [G1(A)⇒ 1 ]
= Pr [G1(A)⇒ 1 ∧ (bad1 ∨ bad2) ]
+ Pr [G1(A)⇒ 1 ∧ ¬(bad1 ∨ bad2) ]
≤ Pr [G2(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ] + Pr [G2(A)⇒ 1 ∧ ¬(bad1 ∨ bad2) ]
where in the final line we use an alternative formulation of the fundamental lemma of
game-playing [5]. Now, notice that in Game G2, the value of Si is always uniformly
random in {0, 1}|Mi|+s, and EΠ’s outputs are independent of each Mi. Consequently
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we can postpone assigning values to each Mi until after A halts. This in turn allows
us to postpone checking to see if bad1 or bad2 should be set without altering the
probability that they will be. We make both these changes to create Game 3 (so
Pr [G2(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ] = Pr [G3(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ]). Thus,
Pr [G2(A)⇒ 1 ∧ ¬(bad1 ∨ bad2) ] = Pr [G3(A)⇒ 1 ∧ ¬(bad1 ∨ bad2) ]
≤ Pr [G3(A)⇒ 1 ] = Pr
[
K
$←−K ; A$K(·,·)⇒ 1
]
where the final equality follows from the fact that in Game G3, each Si is sampled
independently and uniformly at random from the set of appropriately sized strings.
To recap, at this point we have
AdvprivΨ (A) ≤ Advp˜rpE˜ (B) + Pr [G3(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ]
We need an upper bound for Pr [G3(A) ; bad1 ∨ bad2 ]. Therefore suppose that A
has just generated its output after running in G3. We will first bound the probability
that bad1 gets set. Let N =
∣∣{H i : i ≤ q}∣∣ be the number of distinct tweak encodings
generated during the course of the game. Let R1, R2, . . . , RN ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , q} be
equivalence classes characterized by the property that i and j are in the same class if
and only if H i = Hj. The probability that bad1 will be set is at most
∑
k δM(|Rk|).
Note that the upper bound is obtained by summing the values of the increasing
convex function δM at the points |R1| , |R2| , . . . , |RN | where |R1|+|R2|+· · ·+|RN | = q.
Consequently the bound is largest (for fixed q) when N = 1 and R1 = {1, 2, . . . , q}.
Let Capped denote the event that each |Rk| < d; then Pr [G3(A) ; ¬Capped ] ≤ δH(q).
Given that Capped occurs,
∑
k δM(|Rk|) is largest when N = dq/(d− 1)e and |Rk| =
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d− 1 for k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. We have
Pr [G3(A) ; bad1 ] ≤ Pr [G3(A) ; bad1 | Capped ]
+ Pr [G3(A) ; bad1 | ¬Capped ] Pr [G3(A) ; ¬Capped ]
≤ δM(d− 1)d q
d− 1e+ δM(q)δH(q).
By a similar argument,
Pr [G3(A) ; bad2 ] ≤ Pr [G3(A) ; bad2 | Capped ]
+ Pr [G3(A) ; bad2 | ¬Capped ] Pr [G3(A) ; ¬Capped ]
≤ (d− 1)(d− 2)
2m+1
d q
d− 1e+
q(q − 1)
2m+1
δH(q),
since the standard i 7→ i(i−1)/2m+1 birthday bound (for the probability of a collision
among i independent random variables sampled uniformly from {0, 1}m) meets the
criterion of an increasing convex function. This completes the proof.
5.4 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. Let B be the STPRP adversary that simulates the INT-CTXT experiment for
A and outputs 1 if A would set Forges to true. Then Advint-ctxtΨ (A) ≤ Advs˜prpE˜ (B) +
Advint-ctxtΨ[Π] (A), where Ψ[Π] is the scheme obtained by replacing E˜K and E˜
−1
K with
Π and Π−1, respectively, everywhere in the algorithms of Ψ, and Advint-ctxtΨ[Π] (A) is
defined in the natural way (with probabilities over the random choice of Π, rather
than K).
Consider GameG4. By defining Π through lazy sampling, we have Adv
int-ctxt
Ψ[Π] (A) =
Pr [G4(A) ; Forges ]. Note that in the code for the DΠ oracle, we do not need to check
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Games G1 , G2
Oracle EΠ(H,M):
i← i+ 1; Mi ←M
H i ← 〈r,Hi〉 $←− EncodeT (Hi)
M i
$←− EncodeM (H i,Mi)
Si
$←− {0, 1}|M|
if Si ∈ [(..Π] (H i, ·)) then
bad2 ← true
Si
$←− {0, 1}|M| \ [(..Π] (H i, ·))
if M i ∈ dom(Π(H i, ·)) then
bad1 ← true
Si ← Π(H i,M i)
Π(H i,M i)← Si
return r ‖ Si
Game G3
procedure Main(A):
b
$←−AE(·,·)
for i← 1 to q do
M i
$←− EncodeM (H i,Mi)
if M i ∈ dom(Π(H i, ·)) then
bad1 ← true
if Si ∈ [(..Π] (H i, ·)) then bad2 ← true
Π(H i,M i)← Si
return b
Oracle EΠ(H,M):
i← i+ 1; Mi ←M
H i ← 〈r,Hi〉 $←− EncodeT (Hi);
Si
$←− {0, 1}|M |+s
return r ‖ Si
Listing 5.2: Games for the proof of Theorem 7. Boxed commands are omitted in
Game G2, causing the EΠ oracle to always return random strings. We use Game G3 to
bound the probability that this change can be detected by an adversary (as measured
by the probability that a bad will be set).
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Game G4
Oracle EΠ(H,M):
H ← 〈r,H〉 $←− EncodeT (H)
M
$←− EncodeM(H,M)
if M 6∈ dom(Π(H, ·)) then
Π(H,M)
$←− {0, 1}|M| \[(..Π] (H, ·))
return r ‖ Π(H,M)
Oracle DΠ(H, r, C):
H ← 〈r,H〉
M
$←− {0, 1}|C| \ dom(Π(H, ·))
Π(H,M)← C
M ← DecodeM(H,M)
if M ∈ Errors then Forges← true
return M
Listing 5.3: Game G4 simulates the IND-CTXT experiment for SE [Π].
if Π−1(H, Y ) has already been defined; this possibility is excluded by the fact that A
does not repeat queries to DΠ, and does not send DΠ a value previously returned by
EΠ (while preserving the header).
Fix some query to DΠ. The probability that A forges on this query is equal to the
probability that the corresponding, randomly chosen value ofM is a valid encoding.
There are at most 2|Y | valid encodings of the correct length, andM is sampled from
a set of size at least 2|Y | − (qE + qD). Consequently, A forges on this query with
probability at most 2|Y |/(2|Y | − (qE + qD)) < 2m/(2m − 2m−1) = 2. A union bound
completes the proof.
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6. Conclusion
We have contributed novel TBC constructions that provide beyond-birthday-bound
security (LRW2 and TCT2), and others that provide standard birthday-bound security
more efficiently (TCT1 and VCV). Moreover, we have shown how wideblock tweak-
able ciphers can provide authenticated encryption with associated data in a way that
is robust against common implementation errors, and that can leverage pre-existing
randomness and redundancy in plaintexts to improve security. In the process of prov-
ing the security properties of the PIV framework, we believe we have also advanced
the central thesis of Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner: namely, that tweakable blockciphers
permit short, easily verified proofs, and are therefore the “right” starting point for
symmetric-key cryptography.
Our contributions to the design and use of tweakable ciphers were concurrent with
those of other researchers. We briefly describe some of the results that have expanded
on our own, and then discuss directions for further research.
6.1 Subsequent work
Recall that our first major result was quantifying how much additional security could
be obtained by using two rounds of LRW instead of one. We showed that the result,
LRW2, is secure as long as an attacker is limited to q  22n/3 queries, where n is
the block size. This naturally raises the question of how much security r rounds of
LRW could provide. We conjectured in our original paper [29] that r rounds would
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be sufficient as long as q  2rn/(r+1).
In a follow-up work, Lampe and Seurin [28] proved that this bound holds for 2r
rounds, but likewise conjectured that r rounds would be sufficient. This remains an
open problem.
Others have explored ways of constructing TBCs directly, rather than from an
underlying blockcipher. The advantage of this approach is that it offers the possibility
of more efficient constructions; the cost is that security proofs are impossible or rely
on heuristic models. For example, proofs in the ideal cipher model treat a blockcipher
as though it were chosen uniformly at random from the set of all possible blockciphers.
Jean, Nikolic´, and Peyrin described the TWEAKEY framework [26] for modifying
so-called key-alternating blockciphers (of which AES is an example) to transform
them into TBCs. Mennink [36] constructed a TBC that is secure for all q  2n, but
the security proof is in the ideal cipher model. Cogliati, Lampe, and Seurin have
announced [13] that their forthcoming CRYPTO 2015 paper shows LRW2 provides
beyond-birthday-bound security even when both instances of the randomly keyed
blockcipher are replaced with, public, random permutations (the hash function still
has a secret key). More generally, 2r rounds of this variant permit q  2rn/(r+1)
queries, and again the authors conjecture that r rounds are sufficient for this bound.
Hoang, Krovetz, and Rogaway [23] introduced the AEZ wideblock tweakable ci-
pher. AEZ uses a stripped-down version of AES under the hood, and thus its security
does not reduce to the security of (full strength) AES; however, the authors presented
some informal arguments that truncating AES is safe in the specific context of AEZ.
The benefit of this approach is that AEZ becomes extremely fast in software: the au-
thors reported a throughput of about 0.7 cycles per byte. Moreover, they expanded
on our AEAD-from-tweakable-cipher results and prove that using tweakable ciphers
provides what they describe as robust authenticated encryption.
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6.2 Looking forward
While the recent trend towards using heuristic models to analyze TBC constructions
may at first appear problematic, we hope that it proves to be a step towards standard-
izing a dedicated TBC algorithm. Such a TBC would occupy a position similar to
the one AES enjoys today: our confidence in its security would rest on sustained, un-
successful cryptanalysis rather than a standard-model reduction to some underlying
primitive. Security proofs in heuristic models would serve to bolster this confidence.
TBC-based algorithms, including VCV, would be able to immediately make use of
the new primitive, benefiting from its improved efficiency and, one would hope, its
security.
However, it will be some time before a TBC algorithm makes it through some
standardization process and resists cryptanalysis long enough to garner support from
the cryptographic community. Until then, blockcipher-based TBC constructions will
continue to offer a versatile and trustworthy foundation for symmetric-key cryptog-
raphy.
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